The Global War on Terrorism has sent U.S. diplomats and troops around the world. In the current security environment, understanding foreign cultures is crucial to defeating adversaries and working with allies. In this presentation, I explain how U.S. soldiers and commanders can look at military interventions—from preparation to execution—through the lens of cultural awareness, while always minding post-conflict stability operations. I also suggest changes to the traditional intelligence preparation of the battlefield and the military decision-making process.
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Through The Lens Of Cultural Awareness
1. Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: Planning Requirements in Wielding the Instruments of National Power William Wunderle LTC, Infantry Middle East Foreign Area Officer Middle East Division, Political-Military Affairs, J5 [email_address] [email_address]
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5. Who Cares? “ I have been driving in Baghdad for the last 4 days. Whoever thought to call this place the Paris of the Middle East should have their head examined. It's filthy - and not just due to war damage. The people are devious and shifty and you cannot trust them a second; not even the translators…” SFC U.S. Army, Psychological Operations Battalion
6. “… if we had better understood the Iraqi culture and mindset, our war plans would have been even better than they were, [and] the plan for the post-war period and all of its challenges would have been far better…we must improve our cultural awareness…to inform the policy process. Our policies would benefit from this not only in Iraq, but…elsewhere, where we will have long-term strategic relationships and potential military challenges for many years to come.” Ike Skelton, in a letter to Donald Rumsfeld, October 23, 2003
7. “ Those who can win a war well can rarely make good peace, and those who could make good peace would have never won the war.” Winston Churchill
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18. ” لا تحقرن صغيراً في رثاثته، فلربما البعوضة تدمي مقلة الأسد .“ “ Don’t despise those who are unfortunate in threadbare clothes, for even a mosquito can make a lion’s eye bleed.” AL Motanabi, famous Arab Poet Views of Warfare… Traditional…
19. …And Islamic “ So when you meet in battle those who disbelieve, then smite the necks until when you have overcome them, then make prisoners, and afterwards either set them free as a favor or let them ransom themselves until the war terminates” Qur’an 47:4 فإذا لقيتم الذين كفروا فضرب الرقاب حيى إذا أثخنتمو هم فشدوا الوثاق فإما منا بعد وإما فداء حتى تضع الرحب أوزارها
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22. Name Structure Great Grandfather's Name First Name Father’s Name Grandfather’s Name Main Tribe Name HASSAN BASSAM MOHAMMAD RAZAN HASSAN QASIM ALI ABDO AL – MAQTARI Power MANAR
23. Religious Versus Tribal and Civil Structures President Township Director (Head of a Small Town) Civil Structure Sheik of Sheiks (Head of Major Tribe) Sheikh (Head of Sub-Tribe) Head of Clan Tribal Structure Governor (Head of a Governorate) Mayor (Head of A District)
27. Context Sensitivity High Context: Meaning Implicit Languages Low Context: Meaning Explicit in Language Surrounding Information Necessary for Understanding Swiss Germans Scandinavians North Americans Arabs French Italians Latin Americans British Japanese Surrounding Information Necessary for Understanding
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29. Values The base judgments of good and bad common to a culture. Data Events Cues Insight Power Distance Uncertainty Avoidance Long-term Orientation Time Orientation Individualism Relationship/Deal Focus Formality
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35. لا يسلم الشرف الرفيع من الأذى حتى يراق على جوانبه الدم Honor cannot be returned from harm until blood is spilled from its sides.
43. Achieving Cultural Competence “ Cultural and religious ignorance of allies and enemies negatively impact coalition coherence, mask enemy and expose friendly centers of gravity, delay or deter operational success, and influence conflict termination…” Calvin F. Swain Jr.
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45. “ An army of strangers in the midst of strangers.” LTG David Petraeus Commander, Multinational Security Transition Command This cultural wall must be torn down. Lives depend on it.
46. We Recognized The Challenges… …But Did We See Them As Cultural? Iraq’s Security Environment – “A Cultural Fog of War.” Perception Humanitarian Relief and Assistance Arab Street Governance and Administration Infrastructure Recovery Rule of Law Localized Regime Resistance Tribal and Cultural Influences Crime External Fighters Arms Caches Security Lines Of Operation Based on Situational Understanding U n e m p l o y m e n t
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49. Evaluating Intelligence Support To IO During OIF MCO UNIVERSAL TASK LIST OF INTEL SUPPORT TO INFO OPNS SASO WHY EFFECTIVE ACCURACY ACCURACY ACCURACY ACCURACY PREDICTIVE EFFECTIVE PREDICTIVE PREDICTIVE EFFECTIVE IDENTIFY LOCATION AND BIASES OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA IDENTIFY POPULATION DEMOGRAPHICS, ATTITUDES, AND BEHAVIORS IDENTIFY THE ADVERSARY PERCEPTION OF THE MILITARY SITUATION DESCRIBE ADVERSARY DECISION MAKING PROCESSES AND BIASES IDENTIFY PROFILES OF KEY ADVERSARY LEADERS PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO PSYOPS IDENTIFY TARGETS FOR ELECTRONIC ATTACK IDENTIFY ENEMY COMPUTER SYSTEMS IDENTIFY ENEMY COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS IDENTIFY ENEMY C2 NODES
50. The Information Gap WHY WAS INTELLIGENCE EFFECTIVE ON THESE TASKS, BUT NOT OTHERS? WHY DID INTELLIGENCE STRUGGLE TO PERFORM THESE TASKS? WHY DID EFFECTIVENESS DECREASE ACROSS THE BOARD DURING PHASE 4?
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52. Shortfalls Particularly Pronounced in Phase IV Administration, information operations, and conventional military operations Conventional military operations Social and Cognitive Sciences Civil Collection, Sensing Perception ID, Tracking Cognitive Situational Awareness Physical Sciences Physical Sensing Target ID, Tracking Physical Situational Awareness Locating, tracking, identifying, and influencing minds (reason) and hearts (emotions) Locating, tracking, identifying, targeting and killing physical objects (C4ISR) Targets: Hearts and Minds or Gov’t, Tribal and Religious Leaders Targets: Humans and Machines Management of Perception of Civil Government, Population - Stability Attrition of fighting power of Military Units – Decisive Action Stability Operations Warfighting Operations
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54. Closing the Information Gap: Effects-Based Operations and Cultural Intelligence “ Know your enemy and know yourself and in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.” Sun Tzu
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56. Achieving Cultural Competence Requires Changes in Both Training and Doctrine Doctrine Training & Education Culture Factored-In to Decision-Making for Effects-Based Operations Culture Factored IPB Collecting Cultural Information Culture in All-Source Analysis Incorporate into Unit Training Incorporate into Staff Planning AOR Specific Cultural Studies Cultural Support to Commander Train to Study Culture / PME Focused Intel Training Cultural Awareness Cultural Intelligence Cultural Considerations for Military Operations
57. Peacetime Training and Education will Establish Foundations for Cultural Competence Decision-Making and Cultural Intelligence Advanced Training Specific Training Competence Decision Makers Understanding Key Personnel Awareness Focused or Pre-Deployment Consideration All personnel “ How and Why” +PLUS +PLUS +PLUS Timeline ONGOING TRNG DEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS
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61. Modified IPB Cultural Intelligence Traditional IPB Analytic Elements Terrain Analysis Enemy Force Infrastructure Analysis Population Analysis Administrative Operations Information Operations Security Operations Operation Elements Objects of Analysis Natural Terrain Enemy Force Structures (physical and informational) Civil Populations, Institutions Civil Populations, Institutions Information Flows, and Content Civil Populations, Opposition Object of Operations Example Components Topography Hydrography Vegetation Barriers Force Structure Order of Battle Intent Capabilities Timing Buildings LOC's Information channels, nodes - telecom, media Demography Populations Perceptions Norms Decision- making Style Policy, laws, reg's News Security PA, CA PSYOP CNO EW Physical Patrols Searches Raids Direct Action Example Components Battlefield (IPB) Preparation of the Effects-based Operations (EBO) Intelligence Operations Intelligence Modified IPB Equipment
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66. There is a Cultural Gulf Between Iraq and The U.S. United States Iraq Context Sensitivity : Cultures that emphasize the surrounding circumstances (or context), make extensive use of body language, and take the time to build relationships and establish trust. United States Iraq Formality : Cultures that attach considerable importance to tradition, ceremony, social rules, and rank. Iraq United States Time Orientation : Cultures that perceive time as a scarce resource and that tend to be impatient. Iraq United States Long-Term Orientation : Cultures that maintain a long-term perspective. United States Iraq Uncertainty Avoidance : Cultures in which people want predictable and certain futures. United States Iraq Relationship Focus vs. Deal Focus : Refers to the importance of personal relationships in conducting business and negotiations. Iraq United States Individualism : Cultures in which people see themselves first as individuals and believe that their own interests take priority. United States Iraq Power Distance : Cultures in which decisions are made by the boss simply because he or she is the boss. Lower Higher Value
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75. “ They taught me that no man could be their leader except he who ate the rank’s food, wore their clothes, lived with them and yet appeared better in himself.” T.E. Lawrence
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77. اي سؤال؟ Questions “ All men dream: but not equally. Those who dream by night in the dusty recesses of their minds wake in the day to find that it was vanity: but the dreamers of the day are dangerous men, for they may act their dream with open eyes, to make it possible.” T.E. Lawrence