The lecture focused on China's grand strategy and goals under Xi Jinping. Xi aims to dilute U.S. influence in Asia, displace American power from the region, and ultimately dominate a global order more suited to China. There are signs China is using intimidation, coercion, and other aggressive tactics to advance these goals. The lecture also discussed challenges facing the U.S. in countering China's ambitions and strategy across various domains like the military, economy, and technology. Students presented group projects focusing on developing solutions to challenges in U.S.-China competition.
US Navy Needs New Concepts to Compete in Indo-Pacific
1. Technology, Innovation, and Great
Power Competition
INTLPOL 340; MS&E 296
Steve Blank, Joe Felter, Raj Shah
Lecture #2: China China China
28 September 2021
3. Logistics
• For general course related questions, please email the
TAs and not the professors at
tigpctateam@lists.stanford.edu
• 100 word reflections will be due Monday’s at 11:59 PM
• Group project questions will be answered later in class
4.
5.
6.
7. China’s new grand strategy aimed first to
dilute U.S. influence in Asia, then to displace
American power more overtly from the region,
and ultimately to dominate a global order
more suited to Beijing’s governance model.
8. Regrettably, in recent years, there have been disturbing signs that China is
maneuvering toward a policy of intimidation and coercion—harassing
fishermen from the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia; using trade
as a weapon in disputes with its neighbors; using cyber to steal intellectual
property from foreign businesses to benefit its own industries; conducting
dangerous intercepts of military aircraft flying in accordance with international
law; and in the South China Sea, shattering the commitments it made to its
neighbors in the 2002 Declaration of Conduct, as well as more recent
commitments to the U.S. government, by conducting reclamation on disputed
features and militarizing the South China Sea at a startling and destabilizing
rate.
9. There is no ambiguity in Xi’s project. We see in everything he does and -
even in a system designed to be opaque and deceptive - we can see it in his
words. Mr Xi did not invent this ideological project but he has hugely
reinvigorated it. For the first time since Mao we have a leader who
talks and acts like he really means it… The challenge for us is that Xi’s
project of total ideological control does not stop at China’s borders. It is
packaged to travel with Chinese students, tourists, migrants and especially
money. It flows through the channels of the Chinese language internet,
pushes into all the world’s major media and cultural spaces and generally
keeps pace with and even anticipates China’s increasingly global interests.
10. The CCP has made perfectly clear its desire for global preeminence, and officials in
Washington have finally stopped pretending otherwise. Americans, Europeans, and
people the world over are now increasingly cleareyed about Beijing’s intentions and
the sources of its hostile behavior. Elected leaders must now take the next step:
applying their tough new line not just to Beijing but also to elite institutions in
their own societies that need to join the fight against the CCP. Because companies
are economic actors, not political ones, it is the government’s responsibility to
establish guidelines for engaging with adversaries. With strict new parameters,
Washington can level the playing field for all U.S. firms—refreshing their
commitment to the United States’ 245-year-old experiment with democracy
instead of bowing to the Chinese government’s experiment with neo-
totalitarianism. Without such guidelines, however, U.S. firms, money, and
institutions will continue to be coerced into serving Beijing’s ends instead of
democratic principles.
11. ● Former Deputy National Security Advisor
● Former NSC Senior Director for Asia
● 3 combat deployments, U.S. Marine Corps
● Wall Street Journal, Reuters reporter in China
Matthew Pottinger
12. ● Former NSC Director for China
● Former Senior Advisor on China to U.S.
Secretary of Commerce
● Former advisor on China to Chairman and Vice
Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff
● Former Chief of Crisis Planning, INDOPACOM
● 22 years, U.S. Army
Matt Turpin
15. 1) What is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) trying to achieve?
What are its goals and objectives? What is Xi Jinping trying to
achieve? To what extent are Xi’s goals congruent with the broader
CCP’s goals?
1) How does the CCP and/or Xi view the existing international system?
1) From the CCP’s perspective, what are the main obstacles standing in
the way of achieving the goal of “National Rejuvenation”?
16. 4) What role does ideology play in the CCP’s strategy?
4) In what ways are the CCP’s goals compatible and/or incompatible
with U.S. national interests?
4) In what domains does the competition between the United States
and the People’s Republic of China play out? How do these domains
interact with one another?
22. Focus on one area in below matrix
Step 1: Group Project Focus Areas
AI/ML Autonomy Cyber Semis Space Biotech Other
Diplomacy
Information
Military
Economy
Finance
Intelligence
Law
23. A great power competition challenge frames the context for your solution
Step 2: Respond to a Scenario
24. Focus on how to respond to a U.S. great power competition challenge
Step 3: Write a problem statement
The United States Navy needs new operational concepts to
incorporate emerging technologies in order to successfully
compete and deter aggression in the Indo-Pacific.
25. Focus on how to respond to a U.S. great power competition challenge
Step 3: Write a problem statement
The United States Navy needs new operational concepts to
incorporate emerging technologies in order to successfully
compete and deter aggression in the Indo-Pacific.
DIME-FIL
[M] - Military
Scenario
China - Naval
Competition
Tool
CONOPS
Development
26. Focus on how to respond to a U.S. great power competition challenge
Step 3: Write a problem statement
The United States Navy needs new operational concepts to
incorporate emerging technologies in order to successfully
compete and deter aggression in the Indo-Pacific.
In order to retain credible conventional deterrence against the
PRC in the Indo-Pacific, U.S. joint forces must develop, acquire,
and employ a distributed, survivable force to impose increased
costs for the PRC. This strategy depends on distributed, discrete,
low-cost logistics systems that can survive within the WEZ.
27. • Get outside the building!
• Confusion and
uncertainty are part of the
process
Project Expectations
• Weekly Deliverables
• Weekly check-in call with
TA team
• Revised problem statement
and updated interview list
by Mondays @ 11:59 PM
PST
• Key Deadlines
• November 30, 2021: Final
Group Presentations
30. • Russia
• Readings are on Canvas
• TA Team will post Week 3
Reading Reflection prompt
by tomorrow
Next Week
• Team formation & initial
problem statement due
tomorrow at 11:59 PM
31. Technology, Innovation, and Great
Power Competition
INTLPOL 340; MS&E 296
Steve Blank, Joe Felter, Raj Shah
Lecture #2: China China China
28 September 2021