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Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019 1
Anti-money laundering and counter-
terrorist financing (AML/CFT)
measures in the Russian Federation
Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation
Key findings, ratings and priority actions
December 2019
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/mer-russian-federation-2019.html
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019
Ratings – Effectiveness (1/3)
2
Immediate outcome of an effective system to combat money
laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF)
Extent to
which
Russia has
achieved this
objective
1. ML and TF risks are understood and, where appropriate,
actions co-ordinated domestically to combat ML and TF
Substantial
2. International co-operation delivers appropriate information,
financial intelligence, and evidence, and facilitates action
against criminals and their assets
Substantial
3. Supervisors appropriately supervise, monitor and regulate
financial institutions and designated non-financial
businesses and professions (DNFBPs) for compliance with
AML/CFT requirements commensurate with their risks.
Moderate
4. Financial institutions and DNFBPs adequately apply AML/CFT
preventive measures commensurate with their risks, and
report suspicious transactions.
Moderate
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019 3
Immediate outcome of an effective system to combat money
laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF)
Extent to
which
Russia has
achieved this
objective
5. Legal persons and arrangements are prevented from misuse
for money laundering or terrorist financing, and information
on their beneficial ownership is available to competent
authorities without impediments
Substantial
6. Financial intelligence and all other relevant information are
appropriately used by competent authorities for money
laundering and terrorist financing investigations.
High
7. Money laundering offences and activities are investigated
and offenders are prosecuted and subject to effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions
Moderate
8. Proceeds and instrumentalities of crime are confiscated. Substantial
Ratings – Effectiveness (2/3)
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019 4
Immediate outcome of an effective system to combat money
laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF)
Extent to
which
Russia has
achieved this
objective
9. Terrorist financing offences and activities are investigated
and persons who finance terrorism are prosecuted and
subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.
High
10. Terrorists, terrorist organisations and terrorist financiers are
prevented from raising, moving and using funds, and from
abusing the non-profit sector.
Moderate
11. Persons and entities involved in the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction are prevented from raising, moving and
using funds, consistent with the relevant United Nations
Security Council Resolutions.
Moderate
Ratings – Effectiveness (3/3)
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019 5
Ratings – Effectiveness
September
2019
2
4
5
0
High
Substantial
Moderate
Low
17-Dec-19
6
Ratings – technical compliance
(1/5)
AML/CFT POLICIES AND COORDINATION
1. Assessing risks & applying a risk-based approach Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
2. National cooperation and coordination CompliantCompliantCompliantCompliant Compliant
MONEY LAUNDERING AND CONFISCATION
3. Money laundering offence Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
4. Confiscation and provisional measures Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
TERRORIST FINANCING AND FINANCING OF PROLIFERATION
5. Terrorist financing offence Largely CompliantLargely CompliantLargely CompliantLargely CompliantLargely Compliant
6. Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism & terrorist
financing Partially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliant
7. Targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation Partially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliant
8. Non-profit organisations Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
17-Dec-19
7
Ratings – technical compliance
(2/5)
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
9. Financial institution secrecy laws CompliantCompliantCompliantCompliant Compliant
Customer due diligence and record keeping
10. Customer due diligence Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
11. Record keeping Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
Additional measures for specific customers and activities
12. Politically exposed persons Partially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliant
13. Correspondent banking Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
14. Money or value transfer services Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
15. New technologies CompliantCompliantCompliantCompliant Compliant
16. Wire transfers Partially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliant
17-Dec-19
8
Ratings – technical compliance
(3/5)
PREVENTIVE MEASURES (continued)
Reliance, Controls and Financial Groups
17. Reliance on third parties Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
18. Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
19. Higher-risk countries Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
Reporting of suspicious transactions
20. Reporting of suspicious transactions CompliantCompliantCompliantCompliant Compliant
21. Tipping-off and confidentiality Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
Designated non-financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs)
22. DNFBPs: Customer due diligence Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
23. DNFBPs: Other measures Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
17-Dec-19
9
Ratings – technical compliance
(4/5)
TRANSPARENCY AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF LEGAL
PERSONS AND ARRANGEMENTS
24. Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
25. Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal arrangements Partially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliant
POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMPETENT AUTHORITIES
AND OTHER INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES
Regulation and Supervision
26. Regulation and supervision of financial institutions Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
27. Powers of supervisors Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
28. Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
Operational and Law Enforcement
29. Financial intelligence units CompliantCompliantCompliantCompliant Compliant
30. Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative
authorities Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
31. Powers of law enforcement and investigative authorities CompliantCompliantCompliantCompliant Compliant
32. Cash couriers Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
17-Dec-19
10
Ratings – technical compliance
(5/5)
POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMPETENT AUTHORITIES
AND OTHER INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES (continued)
General Requirements
33. Statistics CompliantCompliantCompliantCompliant Compliant
34. Guidance and feedback Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
Sanctions
35. Sanctions Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
36. International instruments Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
37. Mutual legal assistance Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
38. Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
39. Extradition Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
40. Other forms of international cooperation Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019 11
Ratings – technical compliance
September
2019
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019
Key findings
 Rosfinmonitoring is core to the functioning of Russia’s AML/CFT regime,
as it is responsible for leading and co-ordinating policy and operational
activities in the field of AML/CFT. This work is strongly supported,
including legislatively, as AML/CFT is afforded the highest priority by the
Russian government. Domestic co-ordination and co-operation is a
major strength of the Russian AML/CFT system.
 Russian authorities have an in-depth understanding of the country’s
ML and TF risks, as outlined in Russia’s 2018 ML and TF NRAs and
communicated by a2. Russian authorities have an in-depth
understanding of the country’s ML and TF risks, as outlined in
Russia’s 2018 ML and TF NRAs and communicated by authorities to
the assessment team. Both ML and TF risks are well identified and
understood by all authorities. FIs have a good understanding of
these risks, while other reporting entities’ understanding varies.
12
December 2019
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019
Key findings
 Rosfinmonitoring has a wealth of available data, including a large
volume of reporting, and employs sophisticated technologies and high
degree of automation, to prioritise, generate, and contribute to
investigations pursued by law enforcement authorities (LEAs). LEAs
routinely and effectively access and use this financial intelligence to
investigate ML, TF, predicate offenses, and to trace criminal proceeds.
Prosecutors further ensure the use of financial intelligence in case
development by systematically reviewing investigations to verify that
LEAs pursue all financial aspects.
December 2019
13
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019
Key findings
 Russia is investigating ML partly in line with its risk profile. LEAs
routinely conduct financial investigations alongside predicate offences.
Most ML investigations involve the acquisition or sale of criminal
proceeds, so the majority of cases relate to less serious offences. Self-
laundering is frequently investigated, unlike third-party ML, which is
detected and investigated to a lesser extent. Some complex ML is
pursued, however more opportunities for LEAs to uncover and
investigate sophisticated and/or high-value ML may exist, especially in
the financial sector and involving proceeds sent abroad, particularly
those related broadly to corruption. Sanctions applied against natural
persons for ML are moderately effective, and while Russia cannot
prosecute legal persons, the use of administrative sanctions against
legal persons was not demonstrated. Alternative measures are a
notable part of Russia’s toolkit to combat financial and shell company-
related offences potentially related to ML.
14
December 2019
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019
Key findings
15
December 2019
 Russia has a robust legal framework for combatting TF, which is
largely in line with international standards. On average, Russia
pursues 52 TF prosecutions per year. Since 2013, Russia has
convicted more than 300 individuals of TF, with the majority
resulting in sentences of imprisonment ranging from 3-8 years.
Russia demonstrates that it deprives terrorists, terrorist
organisations and terrorist financiers of assets and
instrumentalities through various approaches, such as through
terrorist designations, administrative freezes, court orders, and
confiscation. While the total amount of assets and
instrumentalities deprived is relatively low, this is consistent with
Russia’s risk profile.
 Overall, Russia has an adequate system to implement TF and
proliferation financing (PF) targeted financial sanctions (TFS), but
has gaps and weaknesses in some areas, including TFS
implementation without delay and a lack of explicit, legally
enforceable requirements that extend to all natural and legal
persons (beyond reporting entities).
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019
Key findings
 There is a widespread and persistent trend of non-compliance with preventive
AML/CFT obligations particularly in the financial sector. Although breaches have
been decreasing in recent years, the absolute figures are still worrisome. The
threshold for suspicious transaction reporting is low and automation in filing
leads to a massive number of reports, which, while used in the FIU’s
datamining, are not detailed or suited for flagging a high level of suspicion or
urgency. This increase in STRs could be leading to more terminations of
business relationships and refusals to conduct transactions due to ML/TF
concerns. Group-wide information sharing among FIs was not possible in Russia
until the on-site visit.
 The Bank of Russia (BoR) has implemented some aspects of risk-based
supervision since 2013, and has recently improved the risk-based approach to
supervision. Licensing requirements for FIs were strengthened in 2013 and now
largely mitigate the risk of criminals being the owners or the controllers of FIs.
However, supervision is mostly based on prudential factors and the BoR over-
relies on remote monitoring. While a number of licence revocations have
occurred, sanctions are not effective or dissuasive in all cases and monetary
penalties imposed are low.
16
December 2019
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019
Key findings
 Russia has improved its legal framework and operational approach to
enhance transparency of legal persons, which makes it more difficult to
misuse a legal person established in Russia. Registration requirements
have been enhanced and legal persons are constantly being reviewed
and removed for providing inaccurate information or for inactivity. Legal
persons maintain information on their beneficial owners and
authorities effectively supervise the implementation of this
requirement. FIs and DNFBPs also collect beneficial ownership
information of customers, but have somewhat limited capacity to verify
it.
17
December 2019
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019
Priority Actions for the Russian Federation
to strengthen its AML/CFT System
18
December 2019
 Russia should refine its supervisory approach to ensure that
it is sufficiently ML/TF risk sensitive and independent from
prudential supervision for both FIs and DNFBPs. In
particular, financial supervisors should schedule sufficient
AML/CFT inspections and more frequent unscheduled
inspections when merited. Off-site supervision should be
modified by developing more sensitive means to determine
the risk profile of individual supervised institutions.
 LEAs and prosecutors should prioritise the investigation and
prosecution of complex money laundering, including
professional ML linked to proceeds generated in Russia and
transferred for further laundering abroad.
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019
Priority Actions for the Russian Federation
to strengthen its AML/CFT System
 In investigating shadow financial schemes, authorities
should ensure that the sources of funds and potential links
to predicate offences are fully analysed. Authorities should
continue to use effective alternative offences when
warranted, but pursue ML investigations and consider
whether a third-party ML charge is more appropriate,
especially in cases where using the ML offences may
facilitate international co-operation.
19
December 2019
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019
Priority Actions for the Russian Federation
to strengthen its AML/CFT System
 Russia should take action to implement TFS without
delay and require all natural and legal persons within
Russia to freeze assets and not make any funds,
financial assets or economic resources available for the
benefit of UN designated persons or entities, whether
directly or indirectly.
 Russia should consider ways to strengthen obliged
entities’ understanding of BO requirements and their
implementation, particularly to identify legal persons
owned or controlled by sanctioned entities, namely
through complex structures, in order to detect possible
instances of PF sanctions evasion.
20
December 2019

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Mutual Evaluation Russian Federation 2019 - Ratings

  • 1. Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019 1 Anti-money laundering and counter- terrorist financing (AML/CFT) measures in the Russian Federation Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Key findings, ratings and priority actions December 2019 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/mer-russian-federation-2019.html
  • 2. Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019 Ratings – Effectiveness (1/3) 2 Immediate outcome of an effective system to combat money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) Extent to which Russia has achieved this objective 1. ML and TF risks are understood and, where appropriate, actions co-ordinated domestically to combat ML and TF Substantial 2. International co-operation delivers appropriate information, financial intelligence, and evidence, and facilitates action against criminals and their assets Substantial 3. Supervisors appropriately supervise, monitor and regulate financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) for compliance with AML/CFT requirements commensurate with their risks. Moderate 4. Financial institutions and DNFBPs adequately apply AML/CFT preventive measures commensurate with their risks, and report suspicious transactions. Moderate
  • 3. Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019 3 Immediate outcome of an effective system to combat money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) Extent to which Russia has achieved this objective 5. Legal persons and arrangements are prevented from misuse for money laundering or terrorist financing, and information on their beneficial ownership is available to competent authorities without impediments Substantial 6. Financial intelligence and all other relevant information are appropriately used by competent authorities for money laundering and terrorist financing investigations. High 7. Money laundering offences and activities are investigated and offenders are prosecuted and subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions Moderate 8. Proceeds and instrumentalities of crime are confiscated. Substantial Ratings – Effectiveness (2/3)
  • 4. Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019 4 Immediate outcome of an effective system to combat money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) Extent to which Russia has achieved this objective 9. Terrorist financing offences and activities are investigated and persons who finance terrorism are prosecuted and subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. High 10. Terrorists, terrorist organisations and terrorist financiers are prevented from raising, moving and using funds, and from abusing the non-profit sector. Moderate 11. Persons and entities involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are prevented from raising, moving and using funds, consistent with the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions. Moderate Ratings – Effectiveness (3/3)
  • 5. Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019 5 Ratings – Effectiveness September 2019 2 4 5 0 High Substantial Moderate Low
  • 6. 17-Dec-19 6 Ratings – technical compliance (1/5) AML/CFT POLICIES AND COORDINATION 1. Assessing risks & applying a risk-based approach Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant 2. National cooperation and coordination CompliantCompliantCompliantCompliant Compliant MONEY LAUNDERING AND CONFISCATION 3. Money laundering offence Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant 4. Confiscation and provisional measures Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant TERRORIST FINANCING AND FINANCING OF PROLIFERATION 5. Terrorist financing offence Largely CompliantLargely CompliantLargely CompliantLargely CompliantLargely Compliant 6. Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism & terrorist financing Partially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliant 7. Targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation Partially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliant 8. Non-profit organisations Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
  • 7. 17-Dec-19 7 Ratings – technical compliance (2/5) PREVENTIVE MEASURES 9. Financial institution secrecy laws CompliantCompliantCompliantCompliant Compliant Customer due diligence and record keeping 10. Customer due diligence Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant 11. Record keeping Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant Additional measures for specific customers and activities 12. Politically exposed persons Partially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliant 13. Correspondent banking Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant 14. Money or value transfer services Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant 15. New technologies CompliantCompliantCompliantCompliant Compliant 16. Wire transfers Partially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliant
  • 8. 17-Dec-19 8 Ratings – technical compliance (3/5) PREVENTIVE MEASURES (continued) Reliance, Controls and Financial Groups 17. Reliance on third parties Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant 18. Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant 19. Higher-risk countries Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant Reporting of suspicious transactions 20. Reporting of suspicious transactions CompliantCompliantCompliantCompliant Compliant 21. Tipping-off and confidentiality Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant Designated non-financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) 22. DNFBPs: Customer due diligence Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant 23. DNFBPs: Other measures Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
  • 9. 17-Dec-19 9 Ratings – technical compliance (4/5) TRANSPARENCY AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF LEGAL PERSONS AND ARRANGEMENTS 24. Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant 25. Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal arrangements Partially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliantPartially compliant POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMPETENT AUTHORITIES AND OTHER INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES Regulation and Supervision 26. Regulation and supervision of financial institutions Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant 27. Powers of supervisors Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant 28. Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant Operational and Law Enforcement 29. Financial intelligence units CompliantCompliantCompliantCompliant Compliant 30. Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant 31. Powers of law enforcement and investigative authorities CompliantCompliantCompliantCompliant Compliant 32. Cash couriers Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
  • 10. 17-Dec-19 10 Ratings – technical compliance (5/5) POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMPETENT AUTHORITIES AND OTHER INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES (continued) General Requirements 33. Statistics CompliantCompliantCompliantCompliant Compliant 34. Guidance and feedback Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant Sanctions 35. Sanctions Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 36. International instruments Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant 37. Mutual legal assistance Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant 38. Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant 39. Extradition Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant 40. Other forms of international cooperation Largely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliantLargely compliant
  • 11. Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019 11 Ratings – technical compliance September 2019
  • 12. Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019 Key findings  Rosfinmonitoring is core to the functioning of Russia’s AML/CFT regime, as it is responsible for leading and co-ordinating policy and operational activities in the field of AML/CFT. This work is strongly supported, including legislatively, as AML/CFT is afforded the highest priority by the Russian government. Domestic co-ordination and co-operation is a major strength of the Russian AML/CFT system.  Russian authorities have an in-depth understanding of the country’s ML and TF risks, as outlined in Russia’s 2018 ML and TF NRAs and communicated by a2. Russian authorities have an in-depth understanding of the country’s ML and TF risks, as outlined in Russia’s 2018 ML and TF NRAs and communicated by authorities to the assessment team. Both ML and TF risks are well identified and understood by all authorities. FIs have a good understanding of these risks, while other reporting entities’ understanding varies. 12 December 2019
  • 13. Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019 Key findings  Rosfinmonitoring has a wealth of available data, including a large volume of reporting, and employs sophisticated technologies and high degree of automation, to prioritise, generate, and contribute to investigations pursued by law enforcement authorities (LEAs). LEAs routinely and effectively access and use this financial intelligence to investigate ML, TF, predicate offenses, and to trace criminal proceeds. Prosecutors further ensure the use of financial intelligence in case development by systematically reviewing investigations to verify that LEAs pursue all financial aspects. December 2019 13
  • 14. Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019 Key findings  Russia is investigating ML partly in line with its risk profile. LEAs routinely conduct financial investigations alongside predicate offences. Most ML investigations involve the acquisition or sale of criminal proceeds, so the majority of cases relate to less serious offences. Self- laundering is frequently investigated, unlike third-party ML, which is detected and investigated to a lesser extent. Some complex ML is pursued, however more opportunities for LEAs to uncover and investigate sophisticated and/or high-value ML may exist, especially in the financial sector and involving proceeds sent abroad, particularly those related broadly to corruption. Sanctions applied against natural persons for ML are moderately effective, and while Russia cannot prosecute legal persons, the use of administrative sanctions against legal persons was not demonstrated. Alternative measures are a notable part of Russia’s toolkit to combat financial and shell company- related offences potentially related to ML. 14 December 2019
  • 15. Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019 Key findings 15 December 2019  Russia has a robust legal framework for combatting TF, which is largely in line with international standards. On average, Russia pursues 52 TF prosecutions per year. Since 2013, Russia has convicted more than 300 individuals of TF, with the majority resulting in sentences of imprisonment ranging from 3-8 years. Russia demonstrates that it deprives terrorists, terrorist organisations and terrorist financiers of assets and instrumentalities through various approaches, such as through terrorist designations, administrative freezes, court orders, and confiscation. While the total amount of assets and instrumentalities deprived is relatively low, this is consistent with Russia’s risk profile.  Overall, Russia has an adequate system to implement TF and proliferation financing (PF) targeted financial sanctions (TFS), but has gaps and weaknesses in some areas, including TFS implementation without delay and a lack of explicit, legally enforceable requirements that extend to all natural and legal persons (beyond reporting entities).
  • 16. Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019 Key findings  There is a widespread and persistent trend of non-compliance with preventive AML/CFT obligations particularly in the financial sector. Although breaches have been decreasing in recent years, the absolute figures are still worrisome. The threshold for suspicious transaction reporting is low and automation in filing leads to a massive number of reports, which, while used in the FIU’s datamining, are not detailed or suited for flagging a high level of suspicion or urgency. This increase in STRs could be leading to more terminations of business relationships and refusals to conduct transactions due to ML/TF concerns. Group-wide information sharing among FIs was not possible in Russia until the on-site visit.  The Bank of Russia (BoR) has implemented some aspects of risk-based supervision since 2013, and has recently improved the risk-based approach to supervision. Licensing requirements for FIs were strengthened in 2013 and now largely mitigate the risk of criminals being the owners or the controllers of FIs. However, supervision is mostly based on prudential factors and the BoR over- relies on remote monitoring. While a number of licence revocations have occurred, sanctions are not effective or dissuasive in all cases and monetary penalties imposed are low. 16 December 2019
  • 17. Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019 Key findings  Russia has improved its legal framework and operational approach to enhance transparency of legal persons, which makes it more difficult to misuse a legal person established in Russia. Registration requirements have been enhanced and legal persons are constantly being reviewed and removed for providing inaccurate information or for inactivity. Legal persons maintain information on their beneficial owners and authorities effectively supervise the implementation of this requirement. FIs and DNFBPs also collect beneficial ownership information of customers, but have somewhat limited capacity to verify it. 17 December 2019
  • 18. Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019 Priority Actions for the Russian Federation to strengthen its AML/CFT System 18 December 2019  Russia should refine its supervisory approach to ensure that it is sufficiently ML/TF risk sensitive and independent from prudential supervision for both FIs and DNFBPs. In particular, financial supervisors should schedule sufficient AML/CFT inspections and more frequent unscheduled inspections when merited. Off-site supervision should be modified by developing more sensitive means to determine the risk profile of individual supervised institutions.  LEAs and prosecutors should prioritise the investigation and prosecution of complex money laundering, including professional ML linked to proceeds generated in Russia and transferred for further laundering abroad.
  • 19. Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019 Priority Actions for the Russian Federation to strengthen its AML/CFT System  In investigating shadow financial schemes, authorities should ensure that the sources of funds and potential links to predicate offences are fully analysed. Authorities should continue to use effective alternative offences when warranted, but pursue ML investigations and consider whether a third-party ML charge is more appropriate, especially in cases where using the ML offences may facilitate international co-operation. 19 December 2019
  • 20. Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Russian Federation - Mutual Evaluation Report - Dec 2019 Priority Actions for the Russian Federation to strengthen its AML/CFT System  Russia should take action to implement TFS without delay and require all natural and legal persons within Russia to freeze assets and not make any funds, financial assets or economic resources available for the benefit of UN designated persons or entities, whether directly or indirectly.  Russia should consider ways to strengthen obliged entities’ understanding of BO requirements and their implementation, particularly to identify legal persons owned or controlled by sanctioned entities, namely through complex structures, in order to detect possible instances of PF sanctions evasion. 20 December 2019