Slides from the Pirate Security Conference 2020 in Munich
In 2019 Russia has passed the law about the „Sovereign Internet“, regardless of heavy street protests against it. It does not mean that Russia likes to follow the North-Korean way, on the contrary. We will look at the current and future state of internet governance in Russia and other countries and what we could do about it.
Discussion of:
1. The arguments for digital sovereignty as follows:
- extreme measures in the context of information warfare- confrontation with the United States, which has monopolized the Internet, and has become threat to national sovereignty
- protection of the national output and the economy of the country.
2. The consequences of digital sovereignty:
- “Balkanization” of the network
- loss of network connectivity
- cultural and economic isolation
- Internet censorship and violation of the rights to freedom of expression- mass surveillance and violation of the rights to privacy and secrecy of correspondence.
2. GREGORY ENGELS
Pirate Party Germany
Founding Co-Chairman and
current vice-chair Pirate
Parties International
IT-Entrepreneur
Member of City Council in
Offenbach (Germany)
3. NET BLOCKINGS IN RUSSIA
November 1st 2012 - start of
Roskomnadzor (Russian Committee on
Oversight) and Roskomsvoboda (Russian
Committee on Freedom)
98% of blocking without legal ground
Operators responsibility to enforce
blockings
EUCtHR pending
4. LAW ABOUT PERSONAL DATA
2015: The Data of Russian Customers need
to be stored in Russia.
LinkedIn is blocked since 2016
5.
6. IS IT EFFECTIVE?
Nope.
No evidence of more effective crime investigation/
prevention
No data on decreased terrorism activities
No data on decreased number of suicides (sustained)
Number of criminal cases related to drug sales increased
Collateral damage
8. IMPORT SUBSTITUTION
2015: “foreign software” to be replaced with
“fatherland’s software” till 2021 in all public
organisations.
Official List of Russian Software lists 6128
entries1
Substitution of SWIFT
9. HISTORY OF ATTACS
2007 cyberattacks on Estonia
Stuxnet (2010)
WannaCry (2017)
Petya/Not Petya (2017)
10. SOVEREIGN INTERNET
Motivation “Aggressive US Cyber strategy”.
Regulates (licensed) network operators,
owners of communication networks,
Autonomous System Number holders
11.
12. DIGITAL IRON CURTAIN
DPI Filters
National Domain Name System
Yearly shutoff simulations and stress tests
13. POSSIBLE EXECUTION
Enforced Routing Registry
BGP injections
DPI
Negative impacts:
disappearance of self regulated sustainability
route leaks of “control messages”
interference to business processes (purge of independent ISPs),
corruption
ability to move to Chinese or North Korean way
18. SOME RIGHTS RESERVED
COPYRIGHT 2020 BY GREGORY ENGELS.
EXCEPT WHERE OTHERWISE NOTED, THIS WORK IS LICENSED UNDER
THE CREATIVE COMMONS ATTRIBUTION SHARE ALIKE 4.0 LICENSE