EVOLUTION OF HINDUISM FROM POLYTHEISM TO MONOTHEISM TO MONISM

1. MetaphysicsU. 1.

2. Metaphysics The Nature of Reality
Consider firstly, an ‘ontological’ exercise:
RealUnreal (place the following along this continuum)
Perfection Colours Time Shadows Imagination
God Maths Morality Air Pain
Trees Music Choice Minds Thoughts
Atoms Unicorns Aliens Dreams Souls
Bodies Germs Electricity Dogs Evil

3. Metaphysics The Nature of Reality
Can something be real but not exist, and vice versa?
Can something be real if the senses cannot perceive it?
Which items exist in perpetuity, and which do not?
Are there different ‘modes’ of existence?
RealUnrealWhat qualities, if any, do the similarly grouped items share?

4. MetaphysicsMind Body

5. Metaphysics Body Mind
What constitutes ‘you’?

6. Physical
(assoc. w. body)
Mental
(assoc. w.
mind)
Both
(body & mind)
Neither
Metaphysics Body Mind
Hair Brain Dreams Eyes Teeth
Memories Pain Teeth Ideas Senses
Bones Ideas Taste Fingernails Fear

7. Metaphysics Body Mind
What constitutes ‘you’?
Physical components
Incorporeal components
Blue eyes
Values
Brown hair
Thoughts
Bone & Sinew
Feelings

8. Metaphysics Body Mind
Ostensibly, we are composed of two parts:
The Corporeal Me
The Intangible Me
Are the two actually separate in a meaningful sense?

9. Metaphysics Body Mind
Dualism Monism
2 Approaches/Views

10. Metaphysics Body Mind
Dualists argue there are two
modes/levels of existence:
 A physical level, in which the
corporeal body operates
 And an incorporeal level,
where the mind resides.
Dualism

11. Metaphysics Body Mind
Monists hold that there is
only a single reality:
 An entirely physical reality
where mind and body are
corporeal. (Physicalism)
OR
 An entirely mental/non-
physical reality where matter
does not exist. (Idealism)
Monism

12. The Case for Dualism – Texts for Analysis
1. 2.

13. Greek
Mythology Greek
Humanism
500
BCE
An Intellectual Revolution

14. Rise of Dualism Against a Monist Mythology
“Men find it very hard to believe. They think that after
(the soul) has left the body it no longer exists anywhere,
but that it is destroyed and dissolved on the day the man
dies.”
“No, by god, I haven't. Are you really in a
position to assert that?”
Cebe
Glaucon
“Haven't you realized that our soul is immortal
and never destroyed?”
A Monist attitude prevailed in ancient Greece:

15. The Phaedo - Platonic Dualism
1. Argument Concerning
Indestructibility
2. Argument Concerning
Recollection
3. Argument Concerning
Opposites

16. The Phaedo - Platonic Dualism
1. Argument Concerning
Indestructibility
P1: There are two kinds of existence;
seen and unseen;
P2: The Seen is changeable and the
Unseen is unchanging;
P3: The soul is most alike and akin to the
unseen;
C: Therefore, the soul is most likely
unchanging, and thus indissoluble

17. The Phaedo - Platonic Dualism
2. Argument Concerning
Recollection
P1: We cannot derive knowledge (of
absolutes) from the material world;
P2: We have knowledge (of absolutes);
P3: This knowledge must be obtained
prior to our physical life;
C: Therefore, our soul must exist prior to
our physical existence, and thus is
separate from it.
So true Socrates, gosh you’re
so wise!

18. The Phaedo - Platonic Dualism
3. Argument Concerning
Opposites
P1: All things that have opposites are
generated out of their opposites
P2: Life is the opposite of Death, and
vice versa
P3: The dead are generated from the
living, the living are generated from
the dead
C: Therefore, the souls of the dead must
exist in some place out of which they
come again

19. The Phaedo - Platonic Dualism
1. Argument Concerning
Indestructibility
2. Argument Concerning
Recollection
3. Argument Concerning
Opposites

20. The Case for Dualism – Texts for Analysis
1. 2.

21. Metaphysics Body Mind
C.17th revival of Dualism
‘Cartesian Dualism’

22. Metaphysics Body Mind
C.17th Dualist Revival
1. Argument from Doubt
2. Argument from Indivisibility
‘Cartesian Dualism’

23. 1. Argument from Doubt
Cartesian Dualism
P1: I can doubt my body
(physical self) exists
P2: I cannot doubt that I exist
C: Therefore, I must be
distinct
(a different substance) from
my body

24. Some Responses to ‘The Cogito’
How, Monsieur Descartes, does the existence of
‘thinking’ extend to the existence of an ‘I’? Better
had the conclusion been “it thinks”, as in “it is
raining”.
Descartes, you scoundrel, your cogito already pre-supposes the
existence of "I“ (which is doubting), and therefore concluding
with existence is logically trivial!
Descartes, old boy, I agree with Nietzsche; your process
allows you to claim simply that “thinking is occurring” –
you cannot attribute that thinking to an entity.

25. 2. Argument from Indivisibility
P1: The body is divisible into
parts.
P2: The mind is not divisible
into parts
C: Therefore, the mind is of a
different nature to the
body.
Cartesian Dualism

26. Metaphysics Body Mind
Even if we ‘suppose’ Dualism – problems arise:
How does the incorporeal mind ‘control’ the physical body?

27. Dualist Theories
Epiphenomenalism
Interactionism
Occasionalism
Parallelism
Consider the following theories regarding
dualist mind-body interaction:
How sufficiently do these theories account for the
co-existence of a mental and physical realm/reality?
Setthisonetothe
sidefornow

28. Property Dualism
The ONLY
‘substance’
The
objectiveexperienceof ‘me’
The
subjective
experienceof
‘me’

29. Property Dualism
‘Supervenience’
(pp.76-77 of Phelan)

30. Challenging Substance Dualism

31. The numerous cases of physical damage to the brain resulting in
an alteration to personality and the function of the mind is a common
refutation of dualism
To view the mind as a thing which exists in
addition to the body is a mistake in classification.
- My football team won the game
- The team is made up of 15 members
- The team exists in addition to its members
Is it justified to speak of the mind as an ‘entity’, a ‘thing’ which exists?
Consider:
Person Y did this for person X’s sake
The ‘sake’ is not an entity in itself – just a term of reference
Challenging Substance Dualism
Genuine
Article
Category
Error
Scientific
Evidence
Meaningful
Meaningless

32. Thirsty
Physicalism P s
Behaviourism Functionalism
Unverifiable statements about interior mental life are senseless.
For the behaviourist, ‘mental states’ are just descriptions of behaviour or
dispositions to behave in certain ways
Pain Wincing, shrieking, hopping around, clutching the wound
Would be inclined to drink water if it were available
Problems?
- Pretence?
- Paralysis?
- Qualia?

33. Physicalism P s
Behaviourism Functionalism
The role of the brain is purely functional:
The brain responds to some stimuli (input) and processes a responses (output)Problems?
- The Chinese Room
- Zombies & Mutants
- The Two Marys
- Qualia
(Phelan pp. 87-88)
Mary Mary
http://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/philsyllabus2.html

34. Physicalism P s
Using the Phelan textbook (pp.77 – 83) and internet resources…
(internet encyclopaedia of philosophy & Stanford university philosophy website are good starting places)
Write a brief explanation of the following Materialist theories:
1. Reductive Materialism
2. Eliminative Materialism
3. Biological Naturalism
In addition to your
‘summary’ of the theories,
make some notes about any
problems with these
theories.

35. Enjoyment of ice-cream
Experience of ‘redness’
Love
Thoughts about life
1. Reductive Materialism
BUT: Correlations are not explanations

36. 2. Eliminative Materialism
Enjoyment of ice-cream
Experience of ‘redness’
Love
Thoughts about life
C-fibres firing
Stimulation of frontal lobe
Neural transmitters firing
Increase of dopamine
Notions of thoughts and minds are old fashioned ‘hornswaggle’
BUT: ‘I am only what I can be proved to
be through science’ = fallacy

37. 3. Biological Naturalism
M
M
M
M
‘Dualism in sheep’s clothing’?

38. Physicalism P s

39. Idealism
‘It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men,
that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible
objects have an existence natural or real, distinct from
their being perceived by the understanding. But with how
great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle
may be entertained in the world; yet whoever shall find in
his heart to call it in question, may, if I mistake not,
perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. ‘
P1: We perceive ordinary objects (houses,
mountains, etc.);
P2: We (are able to) perceive only ideas;
C: Therefore, ordinary objects are ideas.
M s

40. Idealism M s
Berkeley does not deny the existence of ordinary objects
such as stones, trees, books, and apples - he holds that
only an immaterialist account of such objects can avoid
scepticism about their existence and nature. What such
objects turn out to be, on his account, are bundles or
collections of ideas.
Where is the texture
of an apple?
Where is the colour
of the apple?
Where is the
‘sweetness’ of an apple?
Where does the sound of
eating an apple exist?

41. Hierarchy of Ideas
Substance
Dualism
Property
Dualism
Monism
M s P s
M p
P s
P p
P s
Interactionism
Parallelism/
Occasionalism
Epiphenomenalism
No exp. of
interaction
necessary.
M sOR
&