enegren final research paper

APUS
Homegrown Terrorism: The
Problem with Self-
Radicalization
Combatting Homegrown Terrorism
Mark Enegren
10/24/2013

Runninghead:CombattingHomegrownTerrorism 1
Homegrown Terrorism: The Problem with Self-Radicalization
Mark Enegren
APUS
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for (SCMT/529 International Terrorism)
October 24, 2013
Telephone: Not For Release
E-mail: Not For Release
Instructor: Dr. Steven Greer

Abstract
The bomb attack on the Boston Marathon in April rekindled the concerns about domestic
homegrown terrorism. Although, the Boston Marathon bombers were naturalized US citizens
their case follows a pattern common in the self-radicalization of homegrown terrorists. This
pattern includes obtaining terrorist propaganda frequently online, communicating with terrorists,
and in some cases receiving terrorist training abroad. The focus of this paper is not specifically
on Boston Marathon bombers but rather on homegrown terrorism and self-radicalization of
persons within the United States. Homegrown terrorists have been identified as US citizens,
citizens of other countries, legal residents, and illegal residents. The commonality between them
is becoming self-radicalized and turning against the United States. The August 2008 report from
the Defense Science Board titled Defense Imperatives for the New Administration emphasizes
that homegrown indigenous and or locally nourished terrorism presents additional challenges. In
their report, they mention that the pool of disaffected potential recruits may be growing, and that
self-radicalization is a particularly worrisome problem. Expanding on these thoughts this paper
examines past cases of self-radicalization and attempts to answer what can be done about the
problem of homegrown terrorism and self-radicalization.
Keywords: Terrorism, Homegrown Terrorism, Self-radicalization, Domestic Terrorism

History
Since 9/11, law enforcement and intelligence services have uncovered 60 plots by
terrorists to attack the United States (Jessica Zuckerman, 2013). Of these plots, 49 are considered
homegrown and 4 of these were successful (2013). The successful attacks include the driving of
an SUV into a crowd of students at the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill in 2006; the
shooting at an Army recruiting center in Little Rock in 2009; the rampage shooting committed
by Nidal Hasan at Fort Hood in 2009; and the Boston Marathon bombings in April of this year.
Although, media attention has focused on large-scale attacks, the vast majority of planned
attacks on the United States have been at the hands of “American citizens, legal permanent
residents, or visitors radicalized predominately in the United States” (2013).
Domestic terrorism is not responsible for the most death and injury when compared to
international terrorism. International terrorism aimed at American targets overseas is responsible
for the vast majority of death and injury. According to one report between 2001 and 2009
excluding the 9/11 victims, there were 21 domestic fatalities as the result of terrorism, of this
number 13 included victims of Nidal Hassan’s rampage shooting at Ft. Hood (David B.
Muhlhausen, 2011). By contrast international terrorism against U.S. interests resulted in 879
deaths and 2,770 injuries (2011). Nonetheless, with incidents like the Ft. Hood attack and the
recent Boston Marathon bombing there is a perception that it is less safe to go about daily life
and business here in the United States. Since perception is reality for many people the statistical
probabilities are less important than the fact that domestic terrorism causes fear and angst among
the citizenry. As Hoffman puts it, terrorists “want maximum publicity to be generated by its

actions and moreover aims at intimidation and subjection to attain its objectives” (Hoffman,
2006, p. 214). There is little doubt about how much media attention a domestic terrorist act
garners and through it fear. Hoffman quoting Dr. Frederick Hacker, said “terrorists seek to
‘frighten and, by frightening, to dominate and control’” (Hoffman, 2006, p. 214). As Scott
Erickson puts it “Their participation in local conflicts also brings a level of media attention far
greater than that which can be generally obtained from indigenous fighters” (2013, para. 7).
It is important to bear in mind that the goal of terrorists is not necessarily to gain a
military victory but instead to cause fear and by doing so control potential victims. In the case of
domestic terrorism as pointed out in the aforementioned report, statistically the chances of
becoming a victim of domestic terrorism are almost nonexistent. Since 9/11, major efforts by the
United States military and intelligence communities have managed to disperse many of the
foremost terrorist organizations. Chief amongst these would be Al Qaeda. Although Al Qaeda
has been unable to mount a large-scale operation against the United States since the death of
Osama bin Laden, this has not stopped terrorists, including radicalized Americans from
attempting various attacks within the United States (James Jay Carafano, 2012). At the time that
Carafano wrote his report on 50 terror plots in April of 2012, nine “Islamist-inspired terror plots
against the United States have been foiled” (2012, para. 1).
“[T]he global operating environment for terrorist networks [has] become increasingly
hostile” (James Jay Carafano, 2012, para. 2). Understandably, harming the United States of
America within its contiguous borders is increasingly difficult for terrorists. Through use of the

Patriot Act, monitoring electronic communications between terrorists is easier. Furthermore,
counterterrorism and intelligence efforts are making entry into the United States a more difficult
proposition than in the past. Nonetheless, terrorist networks continue to work towards attacking
the United States at home. For example, the recent attack at the Westgate Mall in Kenya by Al
Shabaab reinforces the need for continued vigilance. One of Al Shabaab’s stated goals is to
attack the American homeland (David Inserra, 2013). This goal may be closer than people realize
when considering that Al Shabaab is actively recruiting within Muslim communities in the
United States. Reportedly, two or three radicalized American citizens participated in the attacks
on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi (Howden, 2013). In Erickson’s report on radicalization he
highlights that “Minneapolis has seen multiple individuals travel to East Africa to participate in
Islamic extremism with the Islamist group Al-Shabaab” (2013, para. 8).This points out how the
global dynamic has changed and explains why terrorist organizations, such as Al Shabaab, are
actively trying to radicalized and recruit American citizens (2013).
By radicalizing American citizens or residents, terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda
achieve several valuable goals. A homegrown terrorist for example, especially one with ties to
terrorist areas in other countries may have the social and language skills necessary to transition
between two disparate cultures and communities (James Jay Carafano, 2012). Additionally,
homegrown terrorists possess the ability and knowledge as well as documents to travel easily
between points within the United States and sometimes areas outside the United States (2012).
As Erickson points out “Their ability to move more freely in and out of the United States, or
other Western nations, makes them invaluable and less prone to scrutiny by the intelligence
community” (2013, para. 6).

Because the self-radicalized terrorist may not have direct connections to terrorist
organizations and frequently acts as a “lone wolf”, detection by traditional law enforcement
means may be more difficult (2012). The lack of connections to known terrorist organizations
and the tendency to involve fewer players also make detection of the homegrown terrorist more
difficult and more lucrative for terrorist organizations (2012). Because the global environment
for terrorists has been radically altered through the Global War on Terror, and because the
benefits of recruiting or radicalizing new adherents to their cause, the phenomena of homegrown
terrorism will certainly continue and possibly grow. It is because of these facts that actions need
to be taken to identify, detain if necessary, and stop the homegrown terrorist before they act. As
past terrorist events illustrate, the homegrown terrorists should not be taken lightly. One needs
look no further than two of the successful attacks, the Ft. Hood attack and the Boston Marathon
bombing to realize the impact these plots have upon the American psyche if left unchecked.
Unfortunately, detection and interception of these actors is not always easy, and as has been
stated in many ways, they only have to succeed once, whereas the defense must prevail every
time.
The Process of Radicalization
After the Boston bombing, people started asking questions about how young men
that essentially grew up in the United States could become Islamic terrorists. Another attacker,
Nidal Hasan also became radicalized and this, while a member of the armed forces and
ostensibly protecting the Constitution and the homeland from jihadists. How did this happen?
According to a Congressional Research Service report between 1,000 and 2,000 Americans have

travelled abroad to participate in fighting, frequently in their homelands, and to participate in
extremist Islamic activities (Bjelopera, 2013). Occurrences of this nature are known as “foreign
fighters” (2013). These foreign fighters are frequently exposed to the idea of participating in
violent conflicts by what some call “bridge” figures or recruiters that promote the jihadi lifestyle
and philosophy of the terrorist organizations (Erickson, 2013).
Bridge figures use modern means of communication such as social networking,
YouTube, Twitter, websites, and blogs, to facilitate their messages (Erickson, 2013). In the case
of Hasan, email exchanges between him and Anwar al-Awlaki precipitated his transformation
from an officer in the United States Army to an Islamic Jihadist (Herridge, 2012). In her article,
Herridge explains how al-Awlaki used as many as 60 email accounts to maintain discreet
communications with adherents such as Hasan (2012).
According to the Congressional Research Service report on the radicalization
process, the term radicalization “describes the process of acquiring and holding radical,
extremist, or jihadist beliefs” and the term violent extremism means “violent action taken on the
basis of radical or extremist beliefs” (Bjelopera, 2013). This same CRS report also provides an
NYPD intelligence division study on domestic radicalization that has been widely disseminated
among law enforcement nationwide. In the NYPD report, which CRS says should be read with
caution, the NYPD suggests four steps in the process of moving from radicalization to violent
extremism (2013). The first step is referred to as a pre-radicalization phase, where the individual
leads a relatively normal life unaware and uninterested in jihad (2013). The second step involves

self-identification stemming from a crisis or trigger to prompt them to explore Salafism (2013).
The third step is when the bridge figure or as the NYPD report states a “spiritual sanctioner”
indoctrinates or encourages the adoption of jihadist ideology (2013). The final stage is when the
radicalized individual self identifies as a violent jihadist and starts planning terrorist attacks
(2013). Although, the NYPD report describes what some refer to as a “conveyor belt” like
process, others suggest that the radicalization process and movement towards violent jihad varies
greatly (2013).
Studies by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis indicate that the radicalization
dynamic varies across ideological and ethno-religious spectrums, different geographic regions,
and socio-economic conditions (Bjelopera, 2013). Moreover, there are many diverse “pathways”
to radicalization and individuals and groups can radicalize or “de-radicalize” because of a variety
of factors. (2013, p. 13).
Regardless of the path to radicalization and violent jihad, what seems clear from
reviewing the CRS report is that the “bridge figure” or “spiritual sanctioner” is critically
important to the development of this mindset. The CRS report refers to these individuals as
“intermediaries” and suggests that they play a key role in the radicalization process (Bjelopera,
2013). The report identifies “Four charismatic U.S. citizens [that] have played especially
prominent roles in international jihadist propaganda” (2013, p. 14)

Anwar al-Awlaki, Samir Khan, Adam Gadahn, and Omar Hammami all U.S.
citizens played important roles in the recruiting and development of homegrown terrorists. Of the
group only one was actually born in a foreign country, Samir Kahn was born in Saudi Arabia but
lived in Queens and Charlotte. Al Awlaki was known to have mentored those seeking to
radicalize and reportedly exchanged several emails with Nidal Hasan prior to Hasan’s rampage
shooting at Ft. Hood. His sermons are also widely distributed on the internet and other
radicalized homegrown terrorists have been found with his videos in their possession, for
example Marcos Alonso Zea was found with Awlaki’s speeches on his computer after his recent
arrest for trying to join al Qaeda overseas (Secret, 2013). Additionally, Zea was also found with
copies of “Inspire” a magazine aimed at recruiting westerners. Inspire was edited by Samir Kahn
prior to his death while accompanying Awlaki, both were killed in a U.S. drone strike.
According to the CRS report quoting Robbie Brown and Kim Severson of the New York Times,
Inspire magazine was “described as ‘a slick magazine for jihadists ... that featured political and
how-to articles written in a comfortable American vernacular’” (Bjelopera, 2013).
Adam Gadahn, himself influenced by two jihadists as a young man (Bjelopera,
2013) is known for his videos posted online which condemn the United States and encourage
others to join the Jihad. Infamously, Gadahn is the first American charged with treason since
1952 (Stimson, 2010) and remains at large today with a 5 million dollar bounty (Catherine
Herridge, 2013). Omar Hammami, like Gadahn is also known for posting videos online calling
for jihad as well as teaching urban warfare (Bjelopera, 2013). He is tied to the al Shabaab group
and is suspected of recruiting, leading assaults in battle and handling finances.

One common thread with all of these terrorists is that they use modern means of
communication to spread their propaganda. The internet has in some ways become key to their
recruiting efforts. They use it to communicate with potential recruits as well as spread videos of
everything from speeches to training in warfare. As the CRS report points out “Social networks
appear to be central to the radicalization process and to terrorist plots as well” (Bjelopera, 2013,
p. 19). The report expands on this idea suggesting that the internet may facilitate these networks
(2013), which is not difficult to understand considering the difficulties for terrorists to travel
freely to and from the United States. Interestingly, after recent reports in the media of discovered
plots to attack American interests, that were reportedly ferreted out electronically, ostensibly by
the NSA acting through the Patriot Act, terrorist “chatter” diminished remarkably (Cushing,
2013). This suggests that terrorists may have to revert to face-to-face meetings in order to avoid
electronic communications being compromised. One issue is that in the United States, espousal
of contrary ideas is protected under the Constitution. This is because “Americans have the right
under the First Amendment to adopt, express, or disseminate ideas, even hateful and extremist
ones” (Bjelopera, 2013, pp. 11-12). Only after a would be terrorists starts to implement a plan to
attack does law enforcement have the ability to do more than observe, and even this observation
may be on shaky legal ground with respect to Fourth Amendment issues.
Combatting Radicalization
With respect to combatting homegrown radicalization and terrorism, there are two
main approaches available to law enforcement and the intelligence community. These two

approaches, proactive and reactive, are not new to law enforcement. However, politics can play a
part in determining how homegrown terrorism is addressed. In their report from July 2013
addressing 60 terrorist plots discovered since 9/11, Zuckerman et. al. recommend that the current
administration refocus efforts on proactive approaches rather than reactive policies designed with
emphasis on prosecution rather than discovery and disruption. It is unlikely, that the radicalized
terrorist intent on violent jihad will be dissuaded by the thought of prosecution. Terrorists today
are religious fundamentalists and as such view themselves as holy warriors who feel that all
those opposed to them should be annihilated (Turk, 2004). As Clive Walker pointed out jihadists
harbor fanatical, nonnegotiable objectives and punishment is unlikely to daunt them (Walker,
2007).
Aside from adopting a proactive stance, the means to ferret out would be
homegrown terrorists should continue. The United States should maintain a robust
counterterrorism stance by continuing to support the Patriot Act, and other NSA surveillance
programs (Jessica Zuckerman, 2013). These programs, in spite of recent allegations of abuse,
serve a vital function in detecting electronic communications, and monitoring internet traffic
including social networking sites, and websites utilized by terrorist organizations for recruiting
and dissemination of information and orders. Additionally, these activities should be augmented
by counterterrorism strategies aimed at developing informants and agents within communities
that could be considered at risk for possible recruitment and radicalization. For example, several
jihadists have been identified as coming from the Muslim community in and around
Minneapolis. Most recently, al Shabaab reportedly used two or three recruits from this

community is part of the assault team used in the Westgate more attack in Nairobi Kenya
(Howden, 2013).
As news reports regarding uncovering of potential plots by terrorist elements
show, local law enforcement agents are frequently in the vanguard when it comes to exposing
and detecting homegrown terrorism. According to one report, 80% of the 64 terror plots were
uncovered initially by law enforcement officials during routine activities (Scott G Erickson,
2012). As the authors of the report put it “A well-informed and capable infrastructure of law
enforcement personnel, coupled with a vigilant citizenry, has proven to be an important shield
against the machinations of diverse and disparate groups of organizations and individuals with
terrorist inclinations” (2012, para. 16).
This fusion of intelligence, tips from the public, and good police work results in leads,
leading to investigations and ultimately apprehensions. As an example, the authors provide the
case of an Islamic prison gang called Jam’yyat al-Islam al-Saheeh (JIS). To finance their jihadist
plots members of JIS committed street robberies and crimes (2012). Following up on evidence
left at a crime scene officers executed a search warrant resulting in the discovery of documents
outlining a plot to attack military and Jewish establishments in the area (2012). The ultimate
convictions of the members of this terrorist scheme owed its success to front-line police officers
investigating seemingly, what appeared to be a simple robbery. Through efforts such as these as
well as maintained vigilance over electronic mediums coupled with a proactive stance
homegrown terrorism and radicalization, ultimately leading to violent jihad may be thwarted.

Given the current parameters under which terrorists operate, homegrown terrorism is likely to be
a favored tactic in the future. The ability to combat this insidious tactic remains with increased
vigilance combined with current counterterrorism techniques.

Works Cited
Bjelopera, J. P. (2013). American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat. Washington
D.C.: Congressional Research Service.
Catherine Herridge, L. T. (2013, October 24).
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/10/24/benghazi-suspects-not-on-state-department-
list/. Retrieved from www.foxnews.com:
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/10/24/benghazi-suspects-not-on-state-
department-list/
Cushing, T. (2013, October 2). http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131001/15163124717/nsa-
now-claiming-terrorist-chatter-leak-unnamed-govt-officials-more-damaging-than-all-
snowdens-combined.shtml. Retrieved from www.techdirt.com:
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131001/15163124717/nsa-now-claiming-terrorist-
chatter-leak-unnamed-govt-officials-more-damaging-than-all-snowdens-combined.shtml
David B. Muhlhausen, J. B. (2011). Terror Trends: 40 Years' Data on International and
Domestic Terrorism. Washington D.C.: Heritage Foundation. Retrieved from
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/terror-trends-40-years-data-on-
international-and-domestic-terrorism
David Inserra, S. P. (2013, September 30).
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/09/lessons-from-kenya-attack-and-us-
counterterrorism-programs. Retrieved from heritage.org:

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/09/lessons-from-kenya-attack-and-us-
counterterrorism-programs
Erickson, S. (2013). What Motivated the Boston Bomber's trip to Russia? Washington D.C.:
Heritage Foundation.
Herridge, C. (2012, June 15). American cleric used more than 60 email accounts to reach
followers, including Hasan. Retrieved October 25, 2013, from
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reach-followers-including-hasan/
Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Howden, D. (2013, October 4).
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/westgate-mall-attacks-kenya-
terror#part-two. Retrieved from www.theguardian.com:
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terror#part-two
James Jay Carafano, S. P. (2012). Fifty Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11: The Homegrown Threat
and the Long War on Terrorism. Washington D.C.: Heritage Foundation.
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terrorist-plots-since-911-continued-lessons-in-domestic-counterterrorism. Retrieved
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Scott G Erickson, M. A. (2012). A Comprehensive Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) System
Requires Action. Washington D.C.: Heritage Foundation.
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charges-after-failed-trip-to-yemen.html?_r=0
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