PRE-START HEALTH SAFETY REVIEW REPORT of 1000 TON MECHANICAL TRANSFER PRESS

PRE-START HEALTH SAFETY REVIEW REPORT –TRANSFER PRESS# 23 JULIAN KALAC P.ENG
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PRE-START HEALTH AND SAFETY REVIEW
REPORT OF FINDINGS
REGARDING
PTC 1000 TON SERVO TRANSFER PRESS 23
Report Prepared For: Vince Passarelli (General Manager)
Alfield Industries 30 Aviva Park Drive
Vaughan, ON L4L 9C7
Review date: May 17 2018, June 16, 2018
Report date June 19, 2018
Prepared by Julian Kalac, B.Eng, P,Eng
License Number: 90505462
June 19 2018

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PURPOSE OF THE REVIEW:
The purpose of this report is review the Linear servo Transfer press #23, identify safeguarding hazards
non-compliances and recommend remedial measures to control or remove these potential hazards
before the linear system is operated in production, and achieve compliance with relevant provisions of
Regulation 851 prior to start up and operation
IMPLEMENTATION OF PSHR RECOMMENDATIONS
Implementing the measures noted herein or by applying "Equivalency", (O.Reg. 851 S.2), will ensure
compliance with O.Reg. 851 S. 24-27, 40, 41, 42 75, 76 minimum, and ultimately S.7 " Pre-Start
Health & Safety Review".
EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY
The professional engineer will provide the report . The employer is responsible for implementing the
required /recommended remedial measures outlined in this report, summarized in table 1. The
employer must ensure workers will be protected when they use any apparatus, structure, protective
element or process in the workplace.
SITE REVIEW & REPORT WRITING:
The pre-start health and safety review and this report of findings are completed in accordance with
Professional Engineers Ontario's Guideline for Professional Engineers Providing Reports for Pre-Start
Health and Safety Reviews as required by Sections 7 of O.Reg. 851 - Industrial Establishments of the
Ontario Occupational Health and Safety Act, as amended by O.Reg. 528/00.
EMPLOYER
The employer is Alfield Industries a division of Martinrea International, a Tier 1 automotive
manufacturer located in Vaughan, Ontario. The two (2) primary manufacturing processes are metal
stamping, and robotic welding.
REVIEWER
The reviewer is a licensed professional engineer, employed by the employer.
IMPORTANT NOTE:
As a number of the recommendations herein deal with the potential modification of existing protective
elements or the addition of new ones (i.e. interlock switches, devices, systems, etc., that forms a
safety related system), their modification / addition, etc., constitutes a "modified measure and/or
engineering control" made under the PSHR legislation (O.Reg 851 S7 (2)).
Hence, post modification and prior to use, a further review is required to verify those modifications
maintain compliance with current Canadian machine guarding standards and applicable Ontario
Occupational Health and Safety Law, specifically O.Reg 851.

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RISK ANALYSIS:
Risk analysis in accordance with CSA Z432-04 - Safeguarding of Machinery is completed. The Risk
Analysis (as required), is included in this report
REASONS FOR REVIEW
CONDITION YES NO
Has a new apparatus, structure, or protective
element been constructed, added or installed, or
is a new process to be used?
./
Has an existing apparatus, structure, protective
element or process been modified?
./
Have new or modified, engineering controls or
measures, or combination thereof, been
implemented to an existing apparatus, structure,
protective element or process
./
"
CIRCUMSTANCE YES NO
Was a Pre -Start Health and Safety Review
carried out when the apparatus , structure,
protective element or process was originally
installed or implemented?

Was an exemption ever documented that
eliminated the requirement for a Pre-Start Health
and Safety Review?
./
Is there currently any documentation showing that
the apparatus, structure, protective element or
process is currently in compliance of the
Regulation for Industrial Establishments?
./
Do any exemptions apply as per subsections
7 (5), (7),(8), or (9)?
./
Is the documentation required by subsection 7
(10) that establishes any exemptions available in
the workplace?
./
COMMENTS
EVALUATION OF NEW OR EXISTING CONDITIONS
QUALIFIES?
COMMENTS
Upgrade to existing press adding in-press
linear servo transfer
New and modified controls added to
existing press
QUALIFIES?
ASSESSMENT OF APPLICABLE EXEMPTIONS
A Pre-Start Health and Safety Review
was completed in September 5 2006 by
M.H.D Engineering Inc
No such evidence.

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PREVIOUS PSHR COMPLETED 2006
Pre Start Health Safety Review on PTC PRESS P23, MODEL CL4-1000 was conducted on May 5
2006 by M.H.D Engineering Inc. together with de-coiler, straightener and feeder and a certificate of
compliance was issued on September 5, 2006. M.H.D Engineering Inc. Modifications have been
made to the original equipment and most safeguarding controls remain in place as certified by M.H.D
Engineering Inc. As such, this Pre Start Health Safety Review includes PTC PRESS P23, MODEL
CL4-1000 with de-coiler, feeder and straightener,
EQUIPMENT UNDER REVIEW:
The equipment reviewed under this report are:
1. Linear Transfer Automation with Front & Rear FR-Class mounts on the front and rear of press
2. PTC 1000 Ton mechanical straight side press, model CL4-1000
STANDARDS USED FOR EVALUATION:
 O.Reg. 851 - " Industrial Establishments"
 CSA Z142-10- Code for power press operation
 CSA Z460-05- Lock out tag out
 CSA 2432-04 (R2009) - Safeguarding of Machinery; and,
 NFPA 79-07 - Electrical Standard of Industrial Machinery

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PRE-START HEALTH SAFETY REVIEW (“PSHR”)
A Pre-Start Health and Safety Review is required to be performed as per Section 7 of Regulation
851, R.R.O. 1990 under the Occupational Health and Safety Act R.S.O, 1990 which states that a new
apparatus, structure or protective element is to be constructed, added or installed it must be reviewed
by a Professional Engineer to ensure compliance with the applicable codes and safety standards
PRE-START HEALTH AND SAFETY REVIEW (PSHR) TABLE SECTION 7 OHSA REG. 851
Applicable sections of Industrial Establishments OHSA 851 : 24,25, 28
OTHER SYSTEMIC SAFETY COMPLIANCE ISSUES RELATED TO TABLE 1
There are two (2) systemic non-compliances on all presses that are not listed in table 1,
1. Estops incorrectly wired as soft stops, not hard wired,
2. Lack of effective lock out tag out procedures
The above issues are documented in this PSHR and are explained in detail below. Therefore sections
27, 42, 75 and 76 were considered as part of this PSHR .
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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The modified transfer press is not in compliance and remedial action is required in order to bring
the apparatus within compliance of the OHSA and CSA Z142-10 for safe operation.
RANK SAFEGUARDING NON-COMPLIANCE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMPLIANCE
VALID TEST
REQ
1
Ominlink 5000 press controller single channel
without monitoring , not control reliable
Upgrade press control firmware 3.3 dual channel with
monitoring of estops, light curtains, die block and interlock
inputs
YES
2
Light curtains single channel incorrectly wired in
parallel instead of series , can be reset
automatically, does not detect single point
failures
All light curtains must be installed to detect intrusion, stop and
prevent access to hazardous conditions, and not allow
automatic restarting by clearing of faults , without a deliberate
action outside the light curtain area of the press
YES
3
ESTOP malfunction/failure not detected at the
time of failure, press can operate with defective
estop
Upgrade estop to dual channel or self monitoring and press
control firmware 3.3 dual channel with monitoring of estops,
light curtains, die block and interlock inputs
YES
3
Bolster area not guarded, gaps in light curtain
area, operator undetected exposed to crushing
hazards when standing in front of bolster
reaching into ram area
Extend horizontal light curtain all the way to bolster , continuous
no gaps, to ensure the person standing inside danger zone will
continuously be detected by the horizontal light curtain and
protected from accidental cycling of the press.
No
4
Light curtain too close to point of operation ,
does not prevent access to moving parts
Move Vertical and extend Horizontal Light curtain to minimum
35" (800mm) from linear transfer carriage (for stopping time of
500ms)
YES
5
E-STOP Incorrectly wired as soft stop, does
not stop drive motor,
Hard wire all Emergency stops to the OMNILINK 5000 Link
Master Circuit relay (LMC) to ensure drive motor is
disconnected, and disengages the clutch-flywheel from drive
motor
YES
6 Feeder switch not interlocked
Complete required wiring for interlocking feeder gate using the
available interlocking inputs 63/64 or 71/72 to the LMC
SAFETY RELAY
YES
7
Operator Two Hand control (T-stand) not fixed ,
too long cable can be used potentially inside light
curtain in manual mode
Shorten cable on T-stand to minimum a distance outside light
curtain. Hard mount the T-stand outside of the light curtain in a
fixed position
NO
8
Operator # 2 if trapped in danger zone (inside
light curtain) unable to stop press--there is no 2-
hand control on the rear side of press
Connect 2nd T-stand on rear side press, ensure stop and estop
buttons are operational , outside of press light curtain area
YES
9
No lock out tag out procedure on linear
equipment
Developed LOTO needs to be approved and operators trained YES
10 Ram Blocks not rated load capacity
Engrave/plate permanent mark max capacity in units (Lbs/Kg)
on each ram block
NO
SUMMARY TABLE FOR P-23 PSHR COMPLIANCE

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OVERVIEW OF THE EQUIPMENT
PRESS # 23 is a PTC 1000 Ton partial revolution mechanical straight side press, model CL4-1000
manufactured by PTC. Part revolution clutches can be disengaged at any point before the
crankshaft has completed a full revolution and before the press slide has completed a full
stroke. The part revolution clutches operate in the manner so that the clutch releases and the
brake is applied when the external clutch engaging or dis-engages
The PTC 1000 Ton Press is designed to operate normally in a continuous mode with the
light curtains clear. The press uses light curtains on the front and the rear of the press.
Light curtain interruption at the press also disables feeder operation via a controlled stop.
Operator interaction occurs several points, 1-through the light curtain in front of the bolster
front and back, 2-through guarded outfeed section or through an interlocked door for loading
coils of feed material. Coils are positioned into the cell using a crane, and then the operator
enters the fenced area to set up the coil and thread the material, which is done using a manual
jog-pendant control. The press equipment is provided with single-stroke and jog modes as per
standard practice for this type of equipment. These are activated using two-hand controls on a T-
stands. The light curtain and interlocked door functionality remains active regardless of operating mode.
The Linear Transfer Automation is a servo transfer system, design by Linear Systems. It has Front &
Rear FR-Class mounts, mounted on the front and rear of the press. The Linear servo motors are
synchronized with the press servo motor using the CAM. The linear transfer system controls are tied
into the controls so that when the press stops the linear stops and motion cannot be resumed unless
the press faults are cleared.
The feed line is guarded with a mesh type barrier fence from the back comer of the press around to
the front comer of the loop guide. A body detection light curtain guards the front of the coil line at the
coil car over to the main control console.
LINEAR TRANSFER

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LIST OF DEFICIENCIES
1. Press Controller Omnilink 5000 Not Control Reliable
The current press controller is single channel, not control reliable, not capable of detecting single point
failures :
Recommendation
Upgrade to firmware 3.3 at minimum, which is dual channel inputs for estops, light curtains, interlocked
die blocks, and interlocking devices
2. Light curtains issues :
The light curtains do not extend to the bolster area and can be reset automatically with the person
inside the danger area. The operator on the main panel front side cannot see the operator on the rear
side clearly all the time. This poses a high risk of injury due to the poor visibility between rear and front
side operators and high frequency of someone being at the bolster.
3. Bolster not guarded:
The operators visually inspect, clear jams, remove slugs, adjust grippers all from the outside of the
bolster, using reach in tools. However the press can potentially cycle while an operator is standing
inside the danger zone. The employer relies on locking out light curtains, putting a lock on as flap over
the light curtain to block it. This relies on the operator locking out. If he/she does not lock out they
could be in grave danger.

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Recommendation:
In order to error proof and eliminate the need for blocking/locking out light curtains , it is
recommended that the light curtains be extended all the way to the bolster to detect presence
of a person standing in the danger zone by the bolster. When light curtains are wired they must
(a) be interfaced with the control system such that the detection of an intrusion will stop the hazardous
motion;
(b) be installed and arranged so that people cannot enter the hazardous area without the intrusion
being detected and cannot reach a hazard before the hazardous conditions have ceased;
(c) set to manual reset to not allow the restart of automatic operation by the removal of the intrusion
without a deliberate action outside the safeguarded area of the press; and
(d) have a readily observable indication that the device is functioning.
4. Light curtain too close to point of operation does not prevent access to moving parts
The set brake monitor set point is 500ms. The current light curtain distance from the closest point of
operation linear transfer carriage is 400mm or 17 inches. If the linear stop time is 150ms that would be
barely compliant. However if the linear servo follows the press servo, then the light curtain is too close
Recommendation:
Based on the brake monitor set trip time of 500ms the light curtain needs to be minimum 35 inches
889 mm. This would take into account worst case scenario that the linear servo is following the press
servo and the press brake pads are worn to a point of 500ms stop time.
5. Push Button E-Stops incorrectly wired as soft stops :
The press e-stop and all other estops around the press were tested, when the estop is pressed the
press stops momentarily, and could resume motion if the estop button is released. None of the estops
stopped the drive motor nor disconnect the initiating drive circuit. All the estops are incorrectly wired as
soft stops and not hard stops.
They are all wired in parallel instead of in series to the PLC instead of the Link Master Circuit relay
which disconnects the drive motor and flywheel. None of the Estops override faults and none are self-
monitoring nor dual channel. This constitutes a major non-compliance of section 7.1.3 of standard
CSA Z142-10 . As with the interlocked entry, when an e-stop is signaled, all hazardous machinery
motion must come to an immediate stop, as per CSA Z142-10 it must disconnect power to the initiation
control circuit As such upgrades to the e-stop functionality may be required.

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Recommendation:
Ensure the upgraded E-Stops meet the following wiring, performance and operational characteristics:
When pressed it will immediately stop all hazardous motion as quickly as possible and is self-latching;
•Has a round yellow background;
•The actuation of the E-stop will not cause energy loss related hazards to occur (such as a load
falling or part unclamping, etc.);
•The device requires manual resetting, at the location(s) where the E-stop(s) were / was actuated,
•Resetting the respective E-stop(s) shall not automatically restart the machine but permit restarting;
•It is separate from and overrides any other control(s) in all modes of operation ;
•It will disconnect power to the initiation control circuit;
•It is unobstructed and accessible from all angles;
•It satisfies the requirements of a Category "0" or" I" stop circuit as per NFPA 79-2007 C9.2.5.4.1.3;
•It is dual channel hard-wired outside of any PLC input or control;
•Any existing soft / PLC signal can be used for monitoring the e-stop and can be tied into the device
net control system, but cannot be used for the actuation of a machine shut down and,
•Multiple E-stops (where required), are wired in series with each other, in accordance with the above
recommendation.
6. Two Hand control dual-palm buttons—T-STAND
Operator on rear side can be trapped in danger zone (inside light curtain) unable to stop press. The
operator on rear side has no estop in case of emergency, There is no 2-hand control on the rear side
of press.
Recommendation:
It is recommended a second (2) T-stand be connected on the rear side of the press in a fixed position
outside of the light curtain area in order to prevent accidental or unintentional operation by the use of
one hand and some other part of the body.
7. The Operator Two Hand control (T-stand) is not fixed, cable is too long
The Operator Two Hand control (T-stand) can be used potentially inside danger zone (light curtain) in
manual mode. This poses a danger when in manual mode and press is cycled using the T-stand. The
T-stand only protects the operator who is using it.
Recommendation:
When connecting the second T-stand ensure that both T-stands
• require the use of both hands to be maintained during the hazardous portion of the cycle and
shall signal a stop if one or both hands are removed from the controls;
• require the release of all selected operator’s hand controls and the reactivation of all
operator’s hand controls before a system cycle can be initiated;
• require each operator two-hand control station to be concurrently operated before initiation to cycle

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the system, be maintained during the hazardous press coming down hazardous portion of the cycle,
and signal a stop if one or both hands are removed from the controls;
• require supervisor to deselect operator two-hand controls when more than one operator is present
• prevent cycling of the system if all operator stations are deselected;
• require individual hand controls for each operator when multiple operators are safeguarded by
two-hand controls;
• have controls so located that the operator(s) have a full view and control of the entire die area and
have safeguarding on the side and back;
• have all operator’s hand controls located such that the person operating the controls is located at a
safe distance in accordance with Clause 10;
8. Feeder switch not interlocked
The feeder switch is single channel and not interlocked with the press controller. Because the Omnilink
5000 is single channel, upgrading the firmware to 3.3 and using the available interlocking inputs for the
feeder would be acceptable.
Recommendation:
Complete required wiring for interlocking feeder gate using the available interlocking inputs 63/64 or
71/72 to the LMC SAFETY RELAY
9. No lock out tag out procedure-incorrect/improper lockout instructions to operators
This is a major systemic issue. There is no lockout instructions on the steps required for proper locking
out the press. Die changes and setups are being done on live equipment. Operators are misled to
believe that the estop stops the drive motor and flywheel. Which is incorrect and wrong , It puts the
operators in grave danger. Doing setups and changeovers while the flywheel is running is dangerous.
Recommendation:
The reviewer has developed a proper Safe Work Procedure for die changeovers and die
setups, which lists the proper steps to be taken to lock out the press flywheel by locking out the
master stop, and how to verify zero energy state.
It is recommended that the employer review and implement the lockout procedure. Copy of the
lockout procedure is attached in the Appendix
10. No capacity rating on ram blocks
None of the ram blocks have any capacity rating. This is a systemic issue which can be
potential dangerous. The ram blocks are being interchanged between presses without any
capacity rating.
Recommendation:
Engrave/plate permanent mark max capacity in units (Lbs/Kg) on each ram block

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MACHINE HAZARD REDUCTION
Below is the Hazard Control Hierarchy from CSA Z142 Machine Safeguarding. The objective of the
risk assessment is to eliminate the hazards by design. If not possible then the alternative is to add
safety controls and safeguarding devices to implement engineering controls the hazard at the source

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Severity
Exposure
Avoidance
Severity
Exposure
Avoidance
S2 E2 A2 S1 E1 A1
S2 E1 A2 S1 E1 A1
S2 E1 A1 S1 E1 A1
Task Source of Hazard Initial risk Risk Reduction Measures Final risk
Starting and operation of
equipment in any mode
Entanglement and pinch point
hazards at flywheel, motor,
drive, and crankshaft
PR2 Flywheel, motor, drive, and
crankshaft equipped with fixed
guarding
Equipment to be locked out before
removing any of these guards and
remain locked out until guard is re-
installed.
PR4
Bystander or operator, all
tasks
Accidental contact
Slip/trip/fall from higher level N/A Hazards related to the use of
ladders or personnel lifting
equipment are outside the scope of
this review.
N/A
Clearing jam-ups
Maintenance Misadventure
Struck, pinned, or pinched by
moving parts during attempt to
access process area during
normal operation
PR2 Interlocked maintenance door
Interlocked light curtain Deliberate
restart from outside safeguarded
space
Warning signs, entry procedure
concerning residual risk
PR4
Establishment of enclosure/perimeter guarding
General protection of passersby, protection of personnel outside the cell from hazards present inside the cell
tasks
Accidental contact
Struck, pinned, or pinched by
moving parts during normal
operation
PR1 Fixed guarding Interlocked doors in
closed position
No unrestricted walk-in path from
operator station
Warning signs, entry procedure
concerning residual risk
Light curtain at operator station
Barrier (including tooling) against
walk-in entry into the safeguarded
space
Interlock circuit arrangement to stop
motion during access Deliberate
restart from outside safeguarded
space
Clearance between moving parts
and perimeter guard
PR4
tasks
Accidental contact
Slip/trip/fall from same level N/A Tripping hazards integral to the
machine have been minimized. It is
not possible to completely
eliminate this risk, and it is
necessary to ensure that any spills
or loose parts/debris lying on the
floor are cleaned up promptly to
control this risk.
N/A
RiskLevel
RiskLevel

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S2 E1 A1 S1 E1 A1
S2 E1 A2 S1 E1 A1
S1 E1 A2 S1 E1 A1
S3 E1 A2 S1 E1 A1
S2 E1 A2 S1 E1 A1Scrap removal Maintenance
Tool changing and set-up
Threading feed material
Clearing jam-up
Crushing hazard in die area
– Falling by gravity when not
powered
PR2 Automatic brake/restraint;
counterbalance system; ram
blocking
Residual risk is associated with
ram blocking because there is no
technically feasible method of
enforcing its use. Training in
machine operating procedures,
machine entry procedures, lock-
out procedures, and warning signs
are feasible countermeasures.
PR4
tasks
Electrical shock hazard N/A This hazard is outside the scope of
this report. Electrical inspection is
within the jurisdiction of the
Electrical Safety Authority.
N/A
Scrap removal Maintenance
Clearing jam-up
– powered motion – excluding
“Inch” mode
PR1 Light curtain at operator area;
interlocked maintenance access
door; fixed guards; “control reliable”
cycle initiation from outside
safeguarded space
PR4
Clear jam-up Abnormal ejection of parts from
the machine (product and
loose machine parts) Impact
Release of stored energy in
jammed pneumatic mechanism
PR2 Fixed or closed interlocked guarding
where feasible. Hazards associated
with loading/unloading of heavy
objects via overhead cranes is
outside of the scope of this review.
Personal protective equipment and
appropriate operating practices. It is
not possible to completely eliminate
this risk. In particular, it is not
possible to entirely control risks of
misuse or placement of foreign
objects within the equipment.
User is responsible for releasing
stored pneumatic energy in a
jammed mechanism before reaching
into it.
PR4
Maintenance Clearing jam-
up
Gravity fall of pneumatic
tooling or other components
PR3 Stroke and weight of tooling and
workpieces is not considered to
present significant risk of injury.
PR4
Protection of personnel entering the equipment to perform a power-down service task
Mechanical maintenance on tooling, fixtures, or other equipment within the safeguarded space
Maintenance Struck or pinched by any
moving parts
PR2 Lock-out procedure Interlocked
access doors into feed area
Interlocked light curtain into press
tooling area
Deliberate restart from outside
safeguarded space
PR4

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S3 E1 A2 S1 E1 A1Maintenance
Threading feed material
Clearing jam-ups
Freeing trapped personnel
– “Inch” mode
This is intended to be used
from outside the safeguarded
space only. It is not possible
to provide engineered
protection for persons who
gain full-body access to the
tooling area inside the press
beyond the coverage zones of
safeguarding devices.
PR1 “Control reliable” inch mode controls
operated from outside safeguarded
space; keyswitch mode selection.
Residual risk associated with the
actions of more than one person
acting in co-operation cannot be
completely eliminated. Training in
machine operating procedures,
machine entry procedures, lock-out
procedures, and warning signs are
feasible countermeasures.
It is the user's responsibility to control
access to the key for mode selection.
Any person operating a press in “inch”
mode must be responsible for
ensuring that the operation is
performed in a manner not
endangering any person.
Not all methods of point-of- operation
guarding are feasible when
performing die set-up operations
where it is necessary to guide
material into the die. This operation
shall be performed by reaching into
the die area using tools with the point
of operation guarded by the two-hand
controls.
Safeguarding other than two- hand
controls cannot be utilized when
performing release of a trapped
person under the “emergency plan”.
The position of the trapped person
may
PR4
N/A
Struck by falling object
Motion from release of stored
air pressure
Workpiece comes loose and
falls, is ejected, or gets
jammed
Threading, measurement,
observation and other
functions that require
access during machine
operation - Manual “jog”
mode
All hazards related to manual
reduced-speed mode or
attended program verification
mode, including pinch points,
moving parts, weld flash
exposure, thrown or dropped
objects or debris or sparks,
fume exposure
N/A Hold-to-run enable pendant with slow-
speed jog functions where applicable.
Although compliance with the
provisions of CSA Z432-16 related to
safeguarding the operator during
manual “jog” mode are intended to
reduce these risks, ultimately the
operator must be responsible for the
control of these hazards. In addition to
compliance with the technical
requirements of CAN/CSA Z432-16, it
is of critical importance that the
teacher be made aware of the potential
risks, be trained in the proper use of
the equipment in accordance with the
manufacturer’s operating instructions,
and use appropriate personal
protective equipment.
Protection of personnel entering the cell for a powered-up task
Debugging, fault-finding

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protection against parts flying from the
inside of the machine towards the
operator.
Personal protective equipment must
be used per Clause 14 of CSA Z142-
10.
Tooling must be designed to contain
workpieces to the extent feasible.
Since this machine can be used with
different tooling, the on-going
responsibility for appropriate tooling
design to eliminate this hazard must
lie with the tooling designer.
Tooling must be properly secured in
the press and thoroughly checked for
proper operation.
Training of personnel responsible for
changing tools is a feasible
countermeasure and is the on-going
responsibility of the user.
light curtains) provide no
N/A
Initial start-up after tool for ejecting workpieces or tooling components inside the
change tooling in a hazardous press can cause parts to be
manner ejected. Most practical and
permissible point-of-operation
Tool changing Tooling hazards – potential N/A Failure to adequately secure
guarding on presses (including
limits of the equipment.
Design of new tooling Use
of existing tooling other than
originally intended
Using tools outside
allowable design
parameters
Tool changing – potential for
adverse effect on safety
distance
N/A Tooling must be designed to account
for the required safety distance. Refer
to discussions in this report concerning
light curtains and machine stopping
times.
Since tooling is not an integral part of
the machine, the user must be
responsible for ensuring that all
tooling designs satisfy the safety
distance requirements.
N/A
A residual risk exists of entry into the
die and bolster area beyond the
detection zone of presence- sensing
devices, which is magnified when
tooling smaller than the bolster is
used. No practical technology exists
for detection of personnel in this area.
ensuring that tooling used in the
machine is within the design
allowable design collapse.
parameters User must be responsible for
can cause capacity of restraint
intended devices or blocking devices to be
Using tools outside exceeded, possibly resulting in
Protection of personnel upon initial start-up and tooling try-out
Installing new tooling and initial try-out – Issues over and above those encountered during normal operation
Design of new tooling Crushing hazard in die area N/A Use of tooling heavier than N/A
Use of existing tooling – Falling by gravity when permitted in the original design
other than originally not powered

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S3 E1 A2 S1 E1 A1
S2 E2 A1 S1 E1 A1
S3 E1 A2 S1 E1 A1
S2 E1 A2 S1 E1 A1Loading or unloading parts
improperly (double fed,
improper parts loaded,
proper parts loaded
incorrectly)
Tooling hazards – potential for
ejecting workpieces or tooling
in a hazardous manner
PR2 Overload protection; arrangement of
fixtures to accept only correct parts
and only correctly oriented parts
10.
Tooling must be designed to contain
workpieces to the extent feasible.
Since this machine can be used with
different tooling, the on-going
responsibility for appropriate tooling
design to eliminate this hazard must
lie with the tooling designer.
PR4
Protection of personnel during normal operation
Normal loading / unloading tasks performed at designated stations
Starting powered cycle
Loading or unloading parts
Threading material through
die
“inch” mode
interlocked maintenance access door;
fixed guards; “control reliable” cycle
initiation from outside safeguarded
space (including provisions for
activating continuous mode) Residual
risk associated with the actions of
more than one person acting in co-
operation cannot be completely
eliminated. Training in machine
operating procedures, machine entry
procedures, lock-out procedures, and
warning signs are feasible
countermeasures.
PR4
Attempt to access mid-
stroke, via operator area or
maintenance area
(abnormal entry into tooling
area)
“Inch” mode
interlocked maintenance access door;
fixed guards; “control reliable” interlock
arrangement
PR4
workpieces (e.g. coils of feed
material)
allow for potential swinging to a
reasonable extent.
10.
Since this operation is performed
under totally manual control, it is not
possible to eliminate the hazard.
Operation of lifting devices used for
these purposes is not within the scope
of this review. Refer to O.Reg. 851 s.
51, 53.
Maintenance
Crushing hazards associated
with heavy tooling components
or
PR1 Provide suitable means of lifting, and
adequate clearance within and around
the equipment to
PR4

Page 18 of 39
material feeding or set-up operator to guide the leading edge of
the material into the die using a
suitable tool (generally a crow-bar)
while operating the feeder and press
in manual “jog” or “inch” mode. The
light curtain(s) or physical point-of-
operation guarding cannot be
effective while performing this task,
since the only means of performing
this task is by reaching into the
safeguarded space with a suitable
tool. The feeder must be operated
using a one-hand control since the
other hand is needed for the tool.
A recognized hazard exists when
performing this operation. It is
possible for the operator to reach
pinch points in the die area while
operating the equipment manually.
User shall provide suitable tools for
performing this operation and shall
provide training to operators.
Since this operation is performed
under manual control and is
necessary in order to operate the
equipment, it is not possible to
eliminate the hazard. Risk
assessment is not valid for operations
performed under manual control.
S2 E1 A2 S1 E1 A1
S2 E1 A2 S1 E1 A1
All operating conditions in
which strip is being used –
when running-out the tail
end of the coil
End-of-coil “whipping” hazard PR2 Guides for the material are provided.
Manual re-start required at end of roll
from adjacent operator station with
clear view of hazard area.
10.
PR4
Removal of finished parts Pinch points at parts take-
away conveyor
PR2 Fixed guarding.
Parts to be dropped into bin; further
handling is outside the scope of this
report.
PR4
accepted per CSA Z432-16 Clause
7.21 for this operation, not subject to
risk assessment.
Manual “reverse” operation
(rewinding strip onto coil)
Pinch points and entanglement
hazards at coil
N/A Severe pinch point can exist as the coil
collapses onto itself. This operation is
performed totally under manual control
from the adjacent operator station. The
use of “hold-to-run” controls for
material feeding is accepted per CSA
Z432-16 Clause 7.21 for this
operation, not subject to risk
assessment.
N/A
Adjustment and positioning
of the guides when loading
new coils
Pinch points between coil and
adjustable guides; pinch points
between spindle and inside of
coil
N/A These motions are performed totally
under manual control from the operator
station adjacent to the coil handling
area. The use of “hold-to-run” controls
is
N/A

Page 19 of 39
RISK ASSESSMENT CONCLUSION
Based on the Risk Assessment conducted there is a high risk of injury when
1. there are 2 or more operators while in the bolster area and flywheel running
2. during startup when press is in manual mode, operated by only one (1) T STAND control
3. clearing jams, die maintenance and any work standing outside the bolster area
The recommended remedial actions explained above were considered as part of the risk assessment
and in all cases after implementing recommended action items, the residual risk was negligible.
SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPLIANCE
1. Upgrade press control firmware 3.3 dual channel with monitoring of estops, light curtains, die
block and interlock inputs
2. All light curtains must be installed to detect intrusion, stop and prevent access to hazardous
conditions, and not allow automatic restarting by clearing of faults , without a deliberate action
outside the light curtain area of the press
3. Extend horizontal light curtain all the way to bolster , continuous no gaps, to ensure the person
standing inside danger zone will continuously be detected by the horizontal light curtain and
protected from accidental cycling of the press.
4. Move Vertical and extend Horizontal Light curtain to minimum 35" from linear transfer carriage
(for stopping time of 500ms)
5. Hard wire all Emergency stops to the OMNILINK 5000 Link Master Circuit relay (LMC) to
ensure drive motor is disconnected, and disengages the clutch-flywheel from drive motor
6. Complete required wiring for interlocking feeder gate using the available interlocking inputs
63/64 or 71/72 to the LMC SAFETY RELAY
7. Connect 2nd T-stand on rear side press, ensure stop and estop buttons are operational ,
outside of press light curtain area
8. Shorten cable on T-stand to minimum a distance outside light curtain. Hard mount the T-stand
outside of the light curtain in a fixed position
9. Implement the recommended LOTO SWP and train operators on the proper locking out
10. Engrave/plate permanent marking all ram/die blocks with maximum load capacity

Page 20 of 39
Conclusion & Further Review:
The basic requirement to complete a Pre-Start Health and Safety Review has been satisfied via this
report. What is now required to ensure continued compliance is that all the recommendations made
herein are implemented.
If some or all of the measures specified in this report are not taken, the owner, lessee or employer has
to provide written notice to the Joint Health and Safety Committee or the Health and Safety
representative (if any), of what specific measures have been taken to comply with those relevant
provisions of the Regulation that are listed in the "Table", forming part of O.Reg. 851 S7 and current in
force machine guarding standards.
General Limitations:
The pre-start health and safety review and this report of findings have been completed and prepared
for the sole benefit of the named employer herein on page I . No third parties may rely on this report
without the expressed and written consent of Julian Kalac directly.
The use of this report by the employer and/or third parties upgrading and/or modifying equipment
and/or machinery without the prior written opinion of Julian Kalac is the sole responsibility of the
employer and those third parties. Julian Kalac accepts no responsibility for any and all damages,
work stoppages, accidents, Regulatory non-compliance, etc., suffered by the employer and/or any
third party as a result of decisions made via the use and implementation of this report without the
prior written opinion of Julian Kalac
Julian Kalac, B.Eng, P.Eng
License # 90505462

Page 21 of 39
APPENDIX`

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PRESS 23 CERTIFIED BY M.H.D ENGINEERING PSHR FROM 2006
2018 PRESS 23 WITH MODIFICATIONS
Outfeed
Infeed
REAR SIDE
Side view

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PRESS CONTROL PANEL
OMNILINK5000 PRESS CONTROLLER SCREEN

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MASTER STOP BUTTON—SHUTS OFF MOTOR
FLYWHEEL press 23

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COIL FEEDER GUARDED FIXED GUARD
FEEDER INTERLOCK SWITCH NOT INTERLOCKED WITH PRESS CONTROLLER

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RAM BLOCK CONNECTOR , TWO HAND (T-STAND) CONNECTOR AND RAM BLOCK
NO CAPACITY RATING ON RAM BLOCKS
PUSH MOMENTARY E-STOP BUTTONS
7.1.3.1 Emergency (immediate) stop button
The press shall have an emergency mushroom-head stop button, available to each operator, that
(a) is installed in a prominent location within normal reach of the operator;
(b) will, when struck, immediately stop the press slide/ram/platen and all hazardous motion (except for a
full-revolution press, which by its nature cannot immediately stop);
(c) is separate from and overrides any other control;
(d) is red in accordance with CAN/CSA-Z431;
(e) will disconnect power to the press initiation control circuit; and
(f) is unobstructed and accessible from all angles.

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T-Stand Operator 2 hand control
FRONT VIEW OF DIE and LINEAR TRANSFER

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DANGER ZONE

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PRE-START HEALTH SAFETY REVIEW REPORT of 1000 TON MECHANICAL TRANSFER PRESS

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PRE-START HEALTH SAFETY REVIEW REPORT of 1000 TON MECHANICAL TRANSFER PRESS