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Syrian Air Force and Air Defense
Capabilities
May 2013
by
Elizabeth O’Bagy
Christopher Harmer
Jonathan Dupree
Liam Durfee
Institute for the Study of War
Syrian Air Force and Air Defense
Capabilities
May 2013
by
Elizabeth O’Bagy
Christopher Harmer
Jonathan Dupree
Liam Durfee
Institute for the Study of War
The Syrian Air Force is capable of aerial bombardment and close air support, aerial resupply, and aerial delivery of
chemical weapons. Enumerating viable military options to neutralize Syrian air capabilities requires clear
identification of the problem to solve.
If the problem is how to secure the victory of a secular Syrian opposition over the Assad regime, then disrupting
aerial resupply is critical. It is also feasible without establishing a No Fly Zone (NFZ), and thus without contending
with the Syrian Integrated Air Defense System (IADS).
If the problem is how to reduce air strikes as an operational and humanitarian concern, then disrupting
coordinated fixed wing air operations is also possible without establishing a NFZ, for example by sustaining long-
range fires upon Syrian airfields. The only reason to completely destroy the Syrian IADS is to establish full air
control in order to eliminate rotary wing air strikes.
If the problem is establishing a humanitarian safe zone or corridor, a limited No Fly Zone will provide effective air
cover, which is necessary. However, this would be insufficient to establish a fully “safe” zone with respect to
ground defense. Ground operations are an independent requirement.
If the problem is how to eliminate the chemical threat, then it is important to understand that chemical weapons
cannot be neutralized by air. Grounding the Syrian Air Force by establishing a No Fly Zone will not prevent
delivery of chemical munitions via artillery, and aerial bombardment of chemical facilities carries a high risk of
collateral damage.
Neutralizing Syrian Air Force and
Air Defense Capabilities
Syrian Air Force and Air Defense
Capabilities
May 2013
by
Elizabeth O’Bagy
Christopher Harmer
Jonathan Dupree
Liam Durfee
Institute for the Study of War
Campaign Update:
- Rebel Gains in the South and East: The Opposition seized its first provincial capital at al-
Raqqa in April 2013. The opposition also launched a deliberate operation in southern Syria,
emulating tactics from the northern campaign, namely isolating regime outposts by
disrupting Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs).
- Regime Gains in Homs: Hezbollah has launched a ground assault upon opposition forces
southwest of Homs in the village of al-Qusayr. The Regime reestablished control of the GLOC
connecting Hama to Idlib, relieving pressure to resupply by air. The Regime is now pressing
on al-Qusayr from the north.
- Chemical Weapons: There are reports of CW deployment in Daraya and Ateibeh, villages
proximate to Damascus. The primary delivery mechanism appears to be low-end ground
munitions, possibly Katyusha rockets.
- Israeli Airstrikes: IAF bombed a military and scientific research center in Jamraya north of
Damascus as well as facilities resolving to the 4th Division HQ and the 104th Brigade of the
Syrian Republican Guard. Syrian sources report a total of nine strikes on Sunday.
- Ethnic Cleansing along Coast: Syrian sources report that thousands of civilians have been
massacred in mixed villages along the Syrian coast in recent days. Many civilians, including
Sunni, had fled there for safe haven during the civil war.
Syrian Civil War:
Campaign Update, May 2013
Battle for Damascus:
Campaign Update, May 2013
Highway
Major Routes
Secondary Routes Military Terrain
Contested
Rebel Held
Regime HeldLEGEND
≈
Rebel Operations
Airbase/Airport
Helicopter Base
Refugee Camp
Alawite/Shia Neighborhoods
Military Bases
Israeli Airstrikes (May 2013)
Chemical Strikes (May 2013)
The Battle Damage Assessment to the Syrian Regime is currently
unknown, as is the net effect upon the Battle For Damascus.
Israeli airstrikes against Regime facilities near Damascus occurred on 2 May and 5 May, 2012.
Syrian sources indicate that multiple sites were struck, including Qassioun, Jamraya, and Mazzeh.
Jamraya is a chemical research facility.
Syrian Air Capabilities:
May 2013
The Syrian regime is able to conduct:
- Air Strikes. Syrian Air Force is effective at conducting aerial bombardment and close air
support against opposition forces on the ground, as demonstrated by an apparent rise
in air-to-ground attacks since January 2013. The regime began to employ air assets in
the Summer of 2012 in order to repel rebel advance upon urban centers.
- Aerial Resupply. The Syrian regime is able to receive Iranian resupply by air, most likely
through the ad-Dumayr airfield East of Damascus and to Mazzeh military airfield near
the Lebanese border. Aerial resupply within Syria varies, though it has been the primary
mechanism for resupply to outposts that cannot be resupplied by ground
transportation.
- Aerial Delivery of CW. Air-dropped bombs are a traditional method to conduct
chemical attacks. The regime has the capacity to deliver chemical weapons inside
Syrian airspace. It is likely that they also have the requisite delivery mechanism.
- Air Defense. Syrian IADS is well-equipped, but it is old and poorly maintained. Against
close-range targets, Syrian IADS is still effective, as demonstrated by the shootdown of
Turkish reconnaissance aircraft in July 2012. Against long-range targets, Syrian IADS is
ineffective, as demonstrated by recent Israeli airstrikes near Damascus.
Syrian Air Strikes:
Increased activity 2013
Regime air strikes have increased since January 2013. Air strikes in 2013 included rotary
wing and fixed wing aircraft, in close air support to regime ground operations and
independent aerial bombardment.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Apr-12 May-12 Jun-12 Jul-12 Aug-12 Sep-12 Oct-12 Nov-12 Dec-12 Jan-13 Feb-13 Mar-13 Apr-13
Rotary Wing Strike
Fixed Wing Strike
Unknown Strike
Note: ISW tracking of airstrikes shifted from YouTube videos to SOHR reporting in November 2012. SOHR reporting is
consistent, validating the upward trend, though less granularity is provided to distinguish rotary from fixed wing strikes.
This data more accurately reflects air strikes against opposition military targets than retaliatory attacks against the
civilian population, which became prevalent in December 2012.
Syrian Air Strikes:
April 2012 - 2013
Apr – Jun 2012 Jul – Sep 2012 Oct – Dec 2012 Jan – Mar 2013 April 2013
Regime airstrikes
were conducted
uniformly with rotary
wing aircraft.
Regime airstrikes
near Idlib and Aleppo
incorporated fixed
wing aircraft.
Regime airstrikes in
Damascus
incorporated fixed
wing aircraft.
The overall volume of
airstrikes increased
along the major
highways in January
2013 as the regime
lost control of the
GLOCS.
Diminished airstrikes
between Hama and
Idlib corresponds
with regime
reestablishment of
GLOC. Attacks also
increased around
Homs and Damascus.
Legend:
Rotary Wing Strikes
Fixed Wing Strikes
Unknown Airstrikes
Title
Syrian Regime Resupply:
Status of Airfields and Roads
The map depicts Syrian airfields and
highways that have been overrun or are
under siege by the opposition. Most of the
airfields in the center and south of Syria are
still available for full use by the regime.
The regime relies primarily upon aerial
resupply where the opposition retains
control of key GLOCS. The regime regained
control of the main highway from Hama to
Idlib in April 2013, freeing air assets for
airstrikes and close air support elsewhere.
Regime resupply is not limited to the ALOCS
and GLOCS depicted here. It is also likely
that the Regime is able to leverage
established criminal networks for northern
resupply as well. The Regime also has the
port at Tartus.
However, aerial resupply is primary for
international resupply. First, it can manage
heavy and sensitive cargo, like Iranian
missiles. Second, GLOCS into Syria are
present, but severely constrained. Third, the
port of Tartus is highly visible and easily
blocked from the sea. Disrupting aerial
resupply will severely degrade the ability of
the Assad regime, and the Syrian Air
Force, to sustain.
Regime Controlled
Opposition Controlled
Contested
Syrian Regime Vulnerability- Equipment:
Supply, Maintenance, and Training
• A majority of SAF fixed wing aircraft are legacy
systems from the former Soviet inventory. These
MiG and SU series aircraft require significant spare
parts supply, maintenance man-hours, and training
to remain in a mission capable status.
• These aircraft require a high level of technical
expertise to fly and employ in combat. These skills
take a long time to acquire, and they are
perishable.
• The majority of SAF fixed wing airstrikes and
resupply missions are conducted with aircraft that
are easier to maintain and operate, specifically the
L-39 for strikes and the IL-76 for transport.
• Therefore, when estimating the equipment
capabilities of the SAF, it is important to recognize
that the Soviet-era MiG and SU series aircraft have
very low / nonexistent mission capable rates. In
order to neutralize the SAF, it is primarily necessary
to neutralize the L-39 and IL-76 fleet.
Aircraft Function QTY
(est)
Mi-8/17 Medium transport
helicopter
100
An-24/26 Medium transport
aircraft
7
IL-76 Medium-Heavy
transport aircraft
5
Mi-2 Attack helicopter 10-20
Mi-24 Attack helicopter 35-48
SA-342 Attack helicopter 35
MiG 21/25 Air-to-Air aircraft 160-
240
MiG 23/29 Attack aircraft 135-
225
SU-22/24 Attack aircraft 80-110
L-39 Trainer aircraft 40-70
Low readiness
High readiness
Syrian Regime Vulnerability- Personnel:
Casualties and Defection
• Defections from the Syrian Air Force began in July 2012, when the graphic below
depicts that SANA stopped reporting its casualties. There have been seven high profile
defections from the Syrian Air Force, in addition to numerous midgrade defections.
• Defections from the Air Force are more difficult because airmen are under tighter
security. The technical skill and unit integrity of the Air Force are high value, and
defections adversely affect readiness.
• The graphic below depicts total Regime KIA/WIA estimates, of which Air Force
casualties comprise a part. The readiness of the Syrian Air Force is also adversely
affected by casualties.
WIA estimated by multiplying KIA x 4
Possible Courses of Action
Neutralize Air Strikes Neutralize Aerial
Resupply
Neutralize CW
threat in Syria /
Lebanon
Establish humanitarian
safe zone on Turkish /
Syrian border
Limited Strikes:
Destroy Critical
Infrastructure
at Airfields
Air strike capability can be
degraded by destroying
runways, command and
control, and fuel.
Aerial resupply capability
(receive/distribute) can be
degraded by destroying
runways, command and
control, and fuel.
CW cannot be
addressed by degraded
critical infrastructure at
Syrian airfields.
Destroying Syrian Air Force
(SAF) infrastructure will
reduce air attacks against a
safe zone.
Limited Strikes:
Destroy Syrian
Air Force (SAF)
Fleet
Syrian air capabilities to
conduct air strikes can be
degraded by destroying
aircraft, specifically L-39.
Aerial resupply (distribution)
can be degraded by destroying
aircraft, specifically IL-76;
(receipt) cannot be addressed
by destroying Syrian planes.
CW cannot be
addressed by destroying
Syrian planes.
Destroying SAF aircraft will
reduce air attacks against a
safe zone.
Establish No Fly
Zone (NFZ)
Syrian air capabilities to
conduct air strikes can be
prevented by establishing a
NFZ.
Syrian air capabilities to
conduct and receive aerial
resupply can be eliminated by
establishing a NFZ.
CW cannot be
addressed by
establishing a NFZ.
Establishing a NFZ on
Turkish / Syrian border will
prevent air attacks against a
safe zone.
Destroy
Chemical
Weapon (CW)
Facilities
Destroying CW facilities will
not degrade Syrian regime
capability to conduct air
strikes.
Destroying CW facilities will
not degrade Syrian regime
capability to conduct and
receive aerial resupply.
Destroying CW facilities
will degrade Syrian
capability to conduct
CW strikes, but may
incur collateral damage.
Destroying CW facilities will
degrade Syrian capability to
conduct CW strikes against
a safe zone.
Ground assault
on CW and
artillery sites
A ground assault on CW and
artillery sites will not
degrade Syrian regime
capabilities to conduct air
strikes.
A ground assault on CW and
artillery sites will not degrade
Syrian regime capabilities to
conduct air strikes.
A ground assault on CW
and artillery sites will
eliminate Syrian regime
capabilities to conduct
CW strikes.
A ground assault on
chemical and artillery sites
will eliminate Syrian regime
capabilities to conduct CW
strikes against a safe zone.
Syrian Air Force and Air Defense
Capabilities
May 2013
by
Elizabeth O’Bagy
Christopher Harmer
Jonathan Dupree
Liam Durfee
Institute for the Study of War
Disrupting the aerial resupply of the Syrian regime will push the regime onto alternate
supply routes, which can be more easily interdicted by the Syrian opposition on land and
the international community at sea.
Degrading the ability of the Syrian Air Force (SAF) to conduct fixed wing air strikes will
push the regime onto rotary wing operations, which can be more easily targeted and
destroyed by the Syrian opposition. In July 2012, rebel success in shooting down regime
helicopters led to a substantial increase in the use of fixed wing aircraft. It may also
encourage the regime to increase artillery, long range rockets, and SCUD missile attacks.
A full or limited No Fly Zone will support a humanitarian corridor or zone, but it will not
fully protect the area against all threats. A No Fly Zone will provide effective air cover to
a humanitarian zone that has established defenses on the ground.
Degrading the Syrian Air Force will not eliminate the CW threat because chemical
weapons can be moved and fired from the ground. This requirement falls outside of this
discussion of Syrian air capabilities.
Conclusion
ADDITIONAL READING
- Syrian Air Defense Force Attack on Turkish Reconnaissance Aircraft (July 2012), by Christopher Harmer
http://www.understandingwar.org/publications?type[0]=backgrounder&type[1]=map&type[2]=other_work&typ
e[3]=report&tid[0]=293&field_lastname_value=&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC&page=1
- Threat and Response: Israeli Missile Defense (August 2012), by Christopher Harmer
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/threat-and-response-israeli-missile-defense
- Iranian Strategy in Syria (May 2013), by Joseph Holliday, William Fulton, and Sam Wyer
http://www.understandingwar.org/report/iranian-strategy-syria
- The Syrian Army: Doctrinal Order of Battle (February 2013), by Joseph Holliday
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/syrian-army-doctrinal-order-battle
- The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War (March 2013), by Joseph Holliday
http://www.understandingwar.org/report/assad-regime
- Free Syrian Army (March 2013), by Elizabeth O’Bagy
http://www.understandingwar.org/report/free-syrian-army
- Syria Update: Implications of Chemical Weapon Use on U.S. Aid Decision (May 2013), by Liam Durfee
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/syria-update-chemical-weapons
@TheStudyofWar www.facebook.com/InstituteForTheStudyofWar

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Updated Syrian Air Force and Air Defense Capabilities

  • 1. Syrian Air Force and Air Defense Capabilities May 2013 by Elizabeth O’Bagy Christopher Harmer Jonathan Dupree Liam Durfee Institute for the Study of War
  • 2. Syrian Air Force and Air Defense Capabilities May 2013 by Elizabeth O’Bagy Christopher Harmer Jonathan Dupree Liam Durfee Institute for the Study of War The Syrian Air Force is capable of aerial bombardment and close air support, aerial resupply, and aerial delivery of chemical weapons. Enumerating viable military options to neutralize Syrian air capabilities requires clear identification of the problem to solve. If the problem is how to secure the victory of a secular Syrian opposition over the Assad regime, then disrupting aerial resupply is critical. It is also feasible without establishing a No Fly Zone (NFZ), and thus without contending with the Syrian Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). If the problem is how to reduce air strikes as an operational and humanitarian concern, then disrupting coordinated fixed wing air operations is also possible without establishing a NFZ, for example by sustaining long- range fires upon Syrian airfields. The only reason to completely destroy the Syrian IADS is to establish full air control in order to eliminate rotary wing air strikes. If the problem is establishing a humanitarian safe zone or corridor, a limited No Fly Zone will provide effective air cover, which is necessary. However, this would be insufficient to establish a fully “safe” zone with respect to ground defense. Ground operations are an independent requirement. If the problem is how to eliminate the chemical threat, then it is important to understand that chemical weapons cannot be neutralized by air. Grounding the Syrian Air Force by establishing a No Fly Zone will not prevent delivery of chemical munitions via artillery, and aerial bombardment of chemical facilities carries a high risk of collateral damage. Neutralizing Syrian Air Force and Air Defense Capabilities
  • 3. Syrian Air Force and Air Defense Capabilities May 2013 by Elizabeth O’Bagy Christopher Harmer Jonathan Dupree Liam Durfee Institute for the Study of War Campaign Update: - Rebel Gains in the South and East: The Opposition seized its first provincial capital at al- Raqqa in April 2013. The opposition also launched a deliberate operation in southern Syria, emulating tactics from the northern campaign, namely isolating regime outposts by disrupting Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs). - Regime Gains in Homs: Hezbollah has launched a ground assault upon opposition forces southwest of Homs in the village of al-Qusayr. The Regime reestablished control of the GLOC connecting Hama to Idlib, relieving pressure to resupply by air. The Regime is now pressing on al-Qusayr from the north. - Chemical Weapons: There are reports of CW deployment in Daraya and Ateibeh, villages proximate to Damascus. The primary delivery mechanism appears to be low-end ground munitions, possibly Katyusha rockets. - Israeli Airstrikes: IAF bombed a military and scientific research center in Jamraya north of Damascus as well as facilities resolving to the 4th Division HQ and the 104th Brigade of the Syrian Republican Guard. Syrian sources report a total of nine strikes on Sunday. - Ethnic Cleansing along Coast: Syrian sources report that thousands of civilians have been massacred in mixed villages along the Syrian coast in recent days. Many civilians, including Sunni, had fled there for safe haven during the civil war. Syrian Civil War: Campaign Update, May 2013
  • 4. Battle for Damascus: Campaign Update, May 2013 Highway Major Routes Secondary Routes Military Terrain Contested Rebel Held Regime HeldLEGEND ≈ Rebel Operations Airbase/Airport Helicopter Base Refugee Camp Alawite/Shia Neighborhoods Military Bases Israeli Airstrikes (May 2013) Chemical Strikes (May 2013) The Battle Damage Assessment to the Syrian Regime is currently unknown, as is the net effect upon the Battle For Damascus. Israeli airstrikes against Regime facilities near Damascus occurred on 2 May and 5 May, 2012. Syrian sources indicate that multiple sites were struck, including Qassioun, Jamraya, and Mazzeh. Jamraya is a chemical research facility.
  • 5. Syrian Air Capabilities: May 2013 The Syrian regime is able to conduct: - Air Strikes. Syrian Air Force is effective at conducting aerial bombardment and close air support against opposition forces on the ground, as demonstrated by an apparent rise in air-to-ground attacks since January 2013. The regime began to employ air assets in the Summer of 2012 in order to repel rebel advance upon urban centers. - Aerial Resupply. The Syrian regime is able to receive Iranian resupply by air, most likely through the ad-Dumayr airfield East of Damascus and to Mazzeh military airfield near the Lebanese border. Aerial resupply within Syria varies, though it has been the primary mechanism for resupply to outposts that cannot be resupplied by ground transportation. - Aerial Delivery of CW. Air-dropped bombs are a traditional method to conduct chemical attacks. The regime has the capacity to deliver chemical weapons inside Syrian airspace. It is likely that they also have the requisite delivery mechanism. - Air Defense. Syrian IADS is well-equipped, but it is old and poorly maintained. Against close-range targets, Syrian IADS is still effective, as demonstrated by the shootdown of Turkish reconnaissance aircraft in July 2012. Against long-range targets, Syrian IADS is ineffective, as demonstrated by recent Israeli airstrikes near Damascus.
  • 6. Syrian Air Strikes: Increased activity 2013 Regime air strikes have increased since January 2013. Air strikes in 2013 included rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft, in close air support to regime ground operations and independent aerial bombardment. 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 Apr-12 May-12 Jun-12 Jul-12 Aug-12 Sep-12 Oct-12 Nov-12 Dec-12 Jan-13 Feb-13 Mar-13 Apr-13 Rotary Wing Strike Fixed Wing Strike Unknown Strike Note: ISW tracking of airstrikes shifted from YouTube videos to SOHR reporting in November 2012. SOHR reporting is consistent, validating the upward trend, though less granularity is provided to distinguish rotary from fixed wing strikes. This data more accurately reflects air strikes against opposition military targets than retaliatory attacks against the civilian population, which became prevalent in December 2012.
  • 7. Syrian Air Strikes: April 2012 - 2013 Apr – Jun 2012 Jul – Sep 2012 Oct – Dec 2012 Jan – Mar 2013 April 2013 Regime airstrikes were conducted uniformly with rotary wing aircraft. Regime airstrikes near Idlib and Aleppo incorporated fixed wing aircraft. Regime airstrikes in Damascus incorporated fixed wing aircraft. The overall volume of airstrikes increased along the major highways in January 2013 as the regime lost control of the GLOCS. Diminished airstrikes between Hama and Idlib corresponds with regime reestablishment of GLOC. Attacks also increased around Homs and Damascus. Legend: Rotary Wing Strikes Fixed Wing Strikes Unknown Airstrikes
  • 8. Title Syrian Regime Resupply: Status of Airfields and Roads The map depicts Syrian airfields and highways that have been overrun or are under siege by the opposition. Most of the airfields in the center and south of Syria are still available for full use by the regime. The regime relies primarily upon aerial resupply where the opposition retains control of key GLOCS. The regime regained control of the main highway from Hama to Idlib in April 2013, freeing air assets for airstrikes and close air support elsewhere. Regime resupply is not limited to the ALOCS and GLOCS depicted here. It is also likely that the Regime is able to leverage established criminal networks for northern resupply as well. The Regime also has the port at Tartus. However, aerial resupply is primary for international resupply. First, it can manage heavy and sensitive cargo, like Iranian missiles. Second, GLOCS into Syria are present, but severely constrained. Third, the port of Tartus is highly visible and easily blocked from the sea. Disrupting aerial resupply will severely degrade the ability of the Assad regime, and the Syrian Air Force, to sustain. Regime Controlled Opposition Controlled Contested
  • 9. Syrian Regime Vulnerability- Equipment: Supply, Maintenance, and Training • A majority of SAF fixed wing aircraft are legacy systems from the former Soviet inventory. These MiG and SU series aircraft require significant spare parts supply, maintenance man-hours, and training to remain in a mission capable status. • These aircraft require a high level of technical expertise to fly and employ in combat. These skills take a long time to acquire, and they are perishable. • The majority of SAF fixed wing airstrikes and resupply missions are conducted with aircraft that are easier to maintain and operate, specifically the L-39 for strikes and the IL-76 for transport. • Therefore, when estimating the equipment capabilities of the SAF, it is important to recognize that the Soviet-era MiG and SU series aircraft have very low / nonexistent mission capable rates. In order to neutralize the SAF, it is primarily necessary to neutralize the L-39 and IL-76 fleet. Aircraft Function QTY (est) Mi-8/17 Medium transport helicopter 100 An-24/26 Medium transport aircraft 7 IL-76 Medium-Heavy transport aircraft 5 Mi-2 Attack helicopter 10-20 Mi-24 Attack helicopter 35-48 SA-342 Attack helicopter 35 MiG 21/25 Air-to-Air aircraft 160- 240 MiG 23/29 Attack aircraft 135- 225 SU-22/24 Attack aircraft 80-110 L-39 Trainer aircraft 40-70 Low readiness High readiness
  • 10. Syrian Regime Vulnerability- Personnel: Casualties and Defection • Defections from the Syrian Air Force began in July 2012, when the graphic below depicts that SANA stopped reporting its casualties. There have been seven high profile defections from the Syrian Air Force, in addition to numerous midgrade defections. • Defections from the Air Force are more difficult because airmen are under tighter security. The technical skill and unit integrity of the Air Force are high value, and defections adversely affect readiness. • The graphic below depicts total Regime KIA/WIA estimates, of which Air Force casualties comprise a part. The readiness of the Syrian Air Force is also adversely affected by casualties. WIA estimated by multiplying KIA x 4
  • 11. Possible Courses of Action Neutralize Air Strikes Neutralize Aerial Resupply Neutralize CW threat in Syria / Lebanon Establish humanitarian safe zone on Turkish / Syrian border Limited Strikes: Destroy Critical Infrastructure at Airfields Air strike capability can be degraded by destroying runways, command and control, and fuel. Aerial resupply capability (receive/distribute) can be degraded by destroying runways, command and control, and fuel. CW cannot be addressed by degraded critical infrastructure at Syrian airfields. Destroying Syrian Air Force (SAF) infrastructure will reduce air attacks against a safe zone. Limited Strikes: Destroy Syrian Air Force (SAF) Fleet Syrian air capabilities to conduct air strikes can be degraded by destroying aircraft, specifically L-39. Aerial resupply (distribution) can be degraded by destroying aircraft, specifically IL-76; (receipt) cannot be addressed by destroying Syrian planes. CW cannot be addressed by destroying Syrian planes. Destroying SAF aircraft will reduce air attacks against a safe zone. Establish No Fly Zone (NFZ) Syrian air capabilities to conduct air strikes can be prevented by establishing a NFZ. Syrian air capabilities to conduct and receive aerial resupply can be eliminated by establishing a NFZ. CW cannot be addressed by establishing a NFZ. Establishing a NFZ on Turkish / Syrian border will prevent air attacks against a safe zone. Destroy Chemical Weapon (CW) Facilities Destroying CW facilities will not degrade Syrian regime capability to conduct air strikes. Destroying CW facilities will not degrade Syrian regime capability to conduct and receive aerial resupply. Destroying CW facilities will degrade Syrian capability to conduct CW strikes, but may incur collateral damage. Destroying CW facilities will degrade Syrian capability to conduct CW strikes against a safe zone. Ground assault on CW and artillery sites A ground assault on CW and artillery sites will not degrade Syrian regime capabilities to conduct air strikes. A ground assault on CW and artillery sites will not degrade Syrian regime capabilities to conduct air strikes. A ground assault on CW and artillery sites will eliminate Syrian regime capabilities to conduct CW strikes. A ground assault on chemical and artillery sites will eliminate Syrian regime capabilities to conduct CW strikes against a safe zone.
  • 12. Syrian Air Force and Air Defense Capabilities May 2013 by Elizabeth O’Bagy Christopher Harmer Jonathan Dupree Liam Durfee Institute for the Study of War Disrupting the aerial resupply of the Syrian regime will push the regime onto alternate supply routes, which can be more easily interdicted by the Syrian opposition on land and the international community at sea. Degrading the ability of the Syrian Air Force (SAF) to conduct fixed wing air strikes will push the regime onto rotary wing operations, which can be more easily targeted and destroyed by the Syrian opposition. In July 2012, rebel success in shooting down regime helicopters led to a substantial increase in the use of fixed wing aircraft. It may also encourage the regime to increase artillery, long range rockets, and SCUD missile attacks. A full or limited No Fly Zone will support a humanitarian corridor or zone, but it will not fully protect the area against all threats. A No Fly Zone will provide effective air cover to a humanitarian zone that has established defenses on the ground. Degrading the Syrian Air Force will not eliminate the CW threat because chemical weapons can be moved and fired from the ground. This requirement falls outside of this discussion of Syrian air capabilities. Conclusion
  • 13. ADDITIONAL READING - Syrian Air Defense Force Attack on Turkish Reconnaissance Aircraft (July 2012), by Christopher Harmer http://www.understandingwar.org/publications?type[0]=backgrounder&type[1]=map&type[2]=other_work&typ e[3]=report&tid[0]=293&field_lastname_value=&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC&page=1 - Threat and Response: Israeli Missile Defense (August 2012), by Christopher Harmer http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/threat-and-response-israeli-missile-defense - Iranian Strategy in Syria (May 2013), by Joseph Holliday, William Fulton, and Sam Wyer http://www.understandingwar.org/report/iranian-strategy-syria - The Syrian Army: Doctrinal Order of Battle (February 2013), by Joseph Holliday http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/syrian-army-doctrinal-order-battle - The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War (March 2013), by Joseph Holliday http://www.understandingwar.org/report/assad-regime - Free Syrian Army (March 2013), by Elizabeth O’Bagy http://www.understandingwar.org/report/free-syrian-army - Syria Update: Implications of Chemical Weapon Use on U.S. Aid Decision (May 2013), by Liam Durfee http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/syria-update-chemical-weapons