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THREAT LANDS Presented by Goh, Su Gim Security Advisor, Asia  F-Secure Response Labs
About me 10 years in the IT Security industry IT network security infrastructure design Assessment and penetration testing Standards and Compliance Security Operation Center / Incident Response Born and Raised in Malaysia Spent 12 years in Hawaii, USA Joined F-Secure about 9 months ago, now based in F-Secure Response Labs, Kuala Lumpur  04 July, 2011 2
Agenda About F-Secure The Threat Landscape today Social Media Networking More than just $$ The un-tethered world Malware for the mobile world
4 July, 2011
© F-Secure / Public 04 April, 2011 6
1988 Founded 1999 IPO (Helsinki Stock Exchange) Today  “Protecting the irreplaceable”  Enabling the safe use of computers and smartphones  Strong solution portfolio covering both consumers and business  The leading Software as a Service (SaaS) partner for operators globally  Over 200 operator partnerships in more than 40 countries Strong market presence in Europe, North America and Asia  Distributors/resellers in more than 100 countries 20 offices globally and over 800 professionals worldwide F-Secure - Summary  2007
F-Secure in Malaysia	 04 July, 2011 8 Operations started 2006 KL Sentral office opened 2006 Moved to Bangsar South May 2009 Today, 2011, 25% of the employees in Asia 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2011
The Virus Eras © F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 9 FLOPPY  LAN  EMAIL  WEB  FACEBOOK, MYSPACE, TWITTER, LINKEDIN? MOBILE MALWARE???
http://campaigns.f-secure.com/brain/index.html © F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 10
Malware Attacks 1986 - 2011 1986 -	Hobbyist attacks 2002 - 	Financial attacks 2005 - 	Spying / Espionage 2010 -	Cyber Sabotage © F-Secure Corporation April 28, 2010 11
© F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 17
© F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 18
Hmm.. Is that my ex-girlfriend viewing my profile? © F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 19
© F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 20
© F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 21
FB’s FAQ © F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 22
LIKE JACKING © F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 23
© F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 24
© F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 25
© F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 26
Critical Infrastructure
Stuxnet
STUXNET Uses 5 Vulnerabilities* Windows  Worm Spreads via USB sticks * 4 zero-days
Signedcomponent – thestolencertificate
Stuxnetisbig Stuxnet 1,5 MB AverageMalware 50-100 KB
Siemens Simatic Step7 WinCC PLC
6es7-417
Bushehr  / Natanz
CASE: hosting.ua – the Ukrainian Datacenter © F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 40
Spring cleaning gone bad… © F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 42
UNTETHERED © F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 45
The big brother aka   大哥大 04 July, 2011 46
The battlefield today.. 04 July, 2011 47
The ever growing Smartphone… 04 July, 2011 48 “Smartphones to break 100 million shipment mark in Asia/Pacific (Excluding Japan) by 2011” - IDC “IDC expects 137 million units in 2011, double the units in 2010” “53% of Chinese citizens in key urban centres own a smartphone, well ahead of countries like the US, where penetration stands at around 30%, and Japan, on 10%” Consultancy Accenture
Smartphone market share: Today and Tomorrow 04 July, 2011 49
Android overtakes BlackBerry as Top US Smartphone platform 04 July, 2011 50
WHAT CAN MOBILE MALWARE DO??? PERSONAL DATA DISCLOSURE PHISHING SPYWARE DIALERWARE FINANCIAL MALWARE 04 July, 2011 51
Huike.cn serving Windows Mobile apps 04 July, 2011 52
3D Anti-Terrorist  04 July, 2011 53
Windows Mobile Trojan Poses as 3D Anti-Terrorist Action War Game Developed by Beijing Huike Technology in China Distributed in windows freeware download sites Packaged with virus written in Russia Malicious code initiate silently international calls to Premium Numbers 04 July, 2011 54
A Dialerware example 04 July, 2011 55
Dialerware continued.. 04 July, 2011 56
The numbers +882346077 		Antarctica +17675033611		Dominican republic +88213213214 	EMSAT satellite prefix +25240221601 	Somalia +2392283261 		São Tomé and Príncipe  +881842011123 	Globalstar satellite prefix
www.keyzone-telemedia.com 04 July, 2011 58
www.premium-rates.com 04 July, 2011 59
Geinimi, Aka 給你米 Android BOT Opens a backdoor and calls home Calls home to various servers: 04 July, 2011 61 www.frijd.comwww.aiucr.com  www.uisoa.comwww.islpast.comwww.piajesj.comwww.qoewsl.com www.weolir.comwww.riusdu.comwww.widifu.comwww.udaore.com
The Variants… HongTouTou紅頭頭 / ADRD Targeting users in China Distributed on free file sharing websites as wallpaper apps Gather IMEI/IMSI - encrypted Search as a mobile user  Emulate clicks as a mobile user Monitor SMS conversations 04 July, 2011 62
Do Androids Dream? [THE MOTHER OF THEM ALL] Root your phone (Admin access) Sends IMEI/IMSI to remote server Steals sensitive data More than 50 applications infected Repackaged by app developer by Myournet Kingmail2010  we20090202 Hosted on Android Market 50,000 to 200,000 downloads in 4 days 04 July, 2011 63 DroidDream
Trojanised apps by Myournet 04 July, 2011 64 Falling Down Super Guitar Solo Super History Eraser Photo Editor Super Ringtone Maker Super Sex Positions Hot Sexy Videos Chess 下坠滚球_Falldown Hilton Sex Sound Screaming Sexy Japanese Girls Falling Ball Dodge Scientific Calculator Dice Roller 躲避弹球 Advanced Currency Converter App Uninstaller 几何战机_PewPew Funny Paint Spider Man 蜘蛛侠
Real App on left and virused-up version (Myournet) 04 July, 2011 65
In case of emergency, press this: 04 July, 2011 66 The KILL SWITCH
On March 1st 2011, Google yanked 58 apps in Android Market March 6th, Google created the Android Market Security Tool to REMOTELY remove the malicious apps and the DroidDreamtrojan from hundreds of thousands of devices Gives me a mixed feeling… 04 July, 2011 67 The Google KILL SWITCH
04 July, 2011 68 And so it was nice and dandy... Fake Google Security  Patch 4 days later.. ,[object Object]
Distributed by an unregulated Chinese app market
Detected by Symantec as BgServicerunning on infected devices
Trojan sends SMS to a command and control server,[object Object]
Yingyonghui.com © F-Secure Confidential 04 July, 2011 70
© F-Secure Confidential 04 July, 2011 71
“SIDELOADING” : Androiddownloadz.com 04 July, 2011 72
04 July, 2011 73 Eventually, virus writerswill realize it's easier to makemoney by infecting phonesthan by infecting computers
So how do I protect myself? 04 July, 2011 74
(1) TRUSTED & REPUTABLE SOURCES Download from reputable app markets Avoid third party app stores (Sideloading) Review developer name, reviews and star ratings If it is too good to be true.. IT IS There is NO FREE LUNCH 04 July, 2011 75
(2) Scrutinize permissions  Check on permissions when installing an app Ensure the  permissions match the features it provides 04 July, 2011 76
(3) Auto-locking, reset and wipe (Housekeeping) Automatic locking after a few minutes of no activity Reset and wipe when disposing or recycling your phone  04 July, 2011 77
(4) Install a mobile security app Install an Anti-virus for your SmartPhone against trojans/viruses/malware Other security vendor features (Anti Theft) include Remote Wipe, Lock & Alarm Remote Alarm GPS Locator Remote backup  04 July, 2011 78

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Threat Lands

  • 1. THREAT LANDS Presented by Goh, Su Gim Security Advisor, Asia F-Secure Response Labs
  • 2. About me 10 years in the IT Security industry IT network security infrastructure design Assessment and penetration testing Standards and Compliance Security Operation Center / Incident Response Born and Raised in Malaysia Spent 12 years in Hawaii, USA Joined F-Secure about 9 months ago, now based in F-Secure Response Labs, Kuala Lumpur 04 July, 2011 2
  • 3. Agenda About F-Secure The Threat Landscape today Social Media Networking More than just $$ The un-tethered world Malware for the mobile world
  • 5.
  • 6. © F-Secure / Public 04 April, 2011 6
  • 7. 1988 Founded 1999 IPO (Helsinki Stock Exchange) Today “Protecting the irreplaceable” Enabling the safe use of computers and smartphones Strong solution portfolio covering both consumers and business The leading Software as a Service (SaaS) partner for operators globally Over 200 operator partnerships in more than 40 countries Strong market presence in Europe, North America and Asia Distributors/resellers in more than 100 countries 20 offices globally and over 800 professionals worldwide F-Secure - Summary 2007
  • 8. F-Secure in Malaysia 04 July, 2011 8 Operations started 2006 KL Sentral office opened 2006 Moved to Bangsar South May 2009 Today, 2011, 25% of the employees in Asia 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2011
  • 9. The Virus Eras © F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 9 FLOPPY  LAN  EMAIL  WEB  FACEBOOK, MYSPACE, TWITTER, LINKEDIN? MOBILE MALWARE???
  • 11. Malware Attacks 1986 - 2011 1986 - Hobbyist attacks 2002 - Financial attacks 2005 - Spying / Espionage 2010 - Cyber Sabotage © F-Secure Corporation April 28, 2010 11
  • 12.
  • 13.
  • 14.
  • 15.
  • 16.
  • 17. © F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 17
  • 18. © F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 18
  • 19. Hmm.. Is that my ex-girlfriend viewing my profile? © F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 19
  • 20. © F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 20
  • 21. © F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 21
  • 22. FB’s FAQ © F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 22
  • 23. LIKE JACKING © F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 23
  • 24. © F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 24
  • 25. © F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 25
  • 26. © F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 26
  • 28.
  • 29.
  • 30.
  • 32.
  • 33. STUXNET Uses 5 Vulnerabilities* Windows Worm Spreads via USB sticks * 4 zero-days
  • 35. Stuxnetisbig Stuxnet 1,5 MB AverageMalware 50-100 KB
  • 38.
  • 40. CASE: hosting.ua – the Ukrainian Datacenter © F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 40
  • 41.
  • 42. Spring cleaning gone bad… © F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 42
  • 43.
  • 44.
  • 45. UNTETHERED © F-Secure / Public 04 July, 2011 45
  • 46. The big brother aka 大哥大 04 July, 2011 46
  • 47. The battlefield today.. 04 July, 2011 47
  • 48. The ever growing Smartphone… 04 July, 2011 48 “Smartphones to break 100 million shipment mark in Asia/Pacific (Excluding Japan) by 2011” - IDC “IDC expects 137 million units in 2011, double the units in 2010” “53% of Chinese citizens in key urban centres own a smartphone, well ahead of countries like the US, where penetration stands at around 30%, and Japan, on 10%” Consultancy Accenture
  • 49. Smartphone market share: Today and Tomorrow 04 July, 2011 49
  • 50. Android overtakes BlackBerry as Top US Smartphone platform 04 July, 2011 50
  • 51. WHAT CAN MOBILE MALWARE DO??? PERSONAL DATA DISCLOSURE PHISHING SPYWARE DIALERWARE FINANCIAL MALWARE 04 July, 2011 51
  • 52. Huike.cn serving Windows Mobile apps 04 July, 2011 52
  • 53. 3D Anti-Terrorist 04 July, 2011 53
  • 54. Windows Mobile Trojan Poses as 3D Anti-Terrorist Action War Game Developed by Beijing Huike Technology in China Distributed in windows freeware download sites Packaged with virus written in Russia Malicious code initiate silently international calls to Premium Numbers 04 July, 2011 54
  • 55. A Dialerware example 04 July, 2011 55
  • 56. Dialerware continued.. 04 July, 2011 56
  • 57. The numbers +882346077 Antarctica +17675033611 Dominican republic +88213213214 EMSAT satellite prefix +25240221601 Somalia +2392283261 São Tomé and Príncipe +881842011123 Globalstar satellite prefix
  • 60.
  • 61. Geinimi, Aka 給你米 Android BOT Opens a backdoor and calls home Calls home to various servers: 04 July, 2011 61 www.frijd.comwww.aiucr.com www.uisoa.comwww.islpast.comwww.piajesj.comwww.qoewsl.com www.weolir.comwww.riusdu.comwww.widifu.comwww.udaore.com
  • 62. The Variants… HongTouTou紅頭頭 / ADRD Targeting users in China Distributed on free file sharing websites as wallpaper apps Gather IMEI/IMSI - encrypted Search as a mobile user Emulate clicks as a mobile user Monitor SMS conversations 04 July, 2011 62
  • 63. Do Androids Dream? [THE MOTHER OF THEM ALL] Root your phone (Admin access) Sends IMEI/IMSI to remote server Steals sensitive data More than 50 applications infected Repackaged by app developer by Myournet Kingmail2010 we20090202 Hosted on Android Market 50,000 to 200,000 downloads in 4 days 04 July, 2011 63 DroidDream
  • 64. Trojanised apps by Myournet 04 July, 2011 64 Falling Down Super Guitar Solo Super History Eraser Photo Editor Super Ringtone Maker Super Sex Positions Hot Sexy Videos Chess 下坠滚球_Falldown Hilton Sex Sound Screaming Sexy Japanese Girls Falling Ball Dodge Scientific Calculator Dice Roller 躲避弹球 Advanced Currency Converter App Uninstaller 几何战机_PewPew Funny Paint Spider Man 蜘蛛侠
  • 65. Real App on left and virused-up version (Myournet) 04 July, 2011 65
  • 66. In case of emergency, press this: 04 July, 2011 66 The KILL SWITCH
  • 67. On March 1st 2011, Google yanked 58 apps in Android Market March 6th, Google created the Android Market Security Tool to REMOTELY remove the malicious apps and the DroidDreamtrojan from hundreds of thousands of devices Gives me a mixed feeling… 04 July, 2011 67 The Google KILL SWITCH
  • 68.
  • 69. Distributed by an unregulated Chinese app market
  • 70. Detected by Symantec as BgServicerunning on infected devices
  • 71.
  • 72. Yingyonghui.com © F-Secure Confidential 04 July, 2011 70
  • 73. © F-Secure Confidential 04 July, 2011 71
  • 75. 04 July, 2011 73 Eventually, virus writerswill realize it's easier to makemoney by infecting phonesthan by infecting computers
  • 76. So how do I protect myself? 04 July, 2011 74
  • 77. (1) TRUSTED & REPUTABLE SOURCES Download from reputable app markets Avoid third party app stores (Sideloading) Review developer name, reviews and star ratings If it is too good to be true.. IT IS There is NO FREE LUNCH 04 July, 2011 75
  • 78. (2) Scrutinize permissions Check on permissions when installing an app Ensure the permissions match the features it provides 04 July, 2011 76
  • 79. (3) Auto-locking, reset and wipe (Housekeeping) Automatic locking after a few minutes of no activity Reset and wipe when disposing or recycling your phone 04 July, 2011 77
  • 80. (4) Install a mobile security app Install an Anti-virus for your SmartPhone against trojans/viruses/malware Other security vendor features (Anti Theft) include Remote Wipe, Lock & Alarm Remote Alarm GPS Locator Remote backup 04 July, 2011 78
  • 81. Keeping yourself posted… www.f-secure.com/weblog Twitter F-Secure mikkohypponen sugimgoh 04 July, 2011 79
  • 82. THE END Q&A? 04 July, 2011 80

Hinweis der Redaktion

  1. F-Secure Labs Helsinki, Finland
  2. F-Secure Labs Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
  3. Virus Eras. Email is no longer the most common way of getting infected, web is. And web infections do not come via vulnerabilities in Windows or in the browser, they come through plugins like Flash And Adobe Reader, which are very common and always out-of-date as Microsoft Update won't patch them. In the future, more of the attacks are done via Social Networks. Your facebook account gets Phished and then the bad boys send status updates to your friends, posing as you. "Check out this cool link!" etc
  4. Siemens PLC 1787 unit.
  5. Still shot from a youtube video showing a test scada attack destroying an engine. Video on youtube, search for: scada aurora cnn engine